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[i] 
Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Energy Law, Business, 
Regulation and Policy at the International Hellenic University.  
It examines the geopolitical impact of the transportation of natural gas from the 
recently discovered gas reserves of the South-Eastern Mediterranean via the proposed 
EastMed pipeline. These new findings have caused tensions in the region and tend to 
transform the established security architecture. This essay primarily focuses on the 
following research questions: (1) How does the construction of the EastMed pipeline 
affect the geopolitical potential of Greece in the South-Eastern Mediterranean? (2) 
What is the geopolitical effect of the Greek-Cypriot-Israeli-Egyptian alliance? (3) What 
is the impact of the EastMed pipeline on Greek foreign policy regarding Cyprus? 
The security architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean subsystem was based on a 
regime of alliances, structured mainly around the US-Turkey-Israel and US-Egypt-Israel 
triangles; this architecture started to evolve into a limited security regime due to the 
emerged Greece-Cyprus-Israel and Greece-Cyprus-Egypt triangles, which promote 
collective action and multilateral cooperation instead of offensive power projection 
and conflict. The geopolitical transformation of the wider region, which has led to the 
strategic alignment of Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, renders the EastMed pipeline a 
project of utmost importance for these states and for regional stability.  
The methodology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis is the tool that this dissertation 
applies, in order to study the geopolitical impact of the EastMed pipeline in the 
geopolitical complex of the South-Eastern Mediterranean. The hypothesis of the 
geopolitical upgrade of Greece has been confirmed, while the tremendous geopolitical 
impact of the Greek-Cypriot-Israeli-Egyptian coalition was clearly illustrated by the 
constructed geopolitical model.   
 
Keywords: EastMed Pipeline, Natural Gas, Geopolitics, South-Eastern Mediterranean, 
Systemic Geopolitical Analysis. 
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Preface 
My interest in geopolitics has led me to investigate various dimensions of 
international affairs in the past. The ongoing energy antagonism in the Mediterranean 
is an extremely interesting field for research, especially when so many different 
aspects of life are interacting simultaneously. Whether we understand it or not, the 
complexity of politics in the Mediterranean is something that affects our everyday life. 
My background in environmental sciences allows me to understand the correlations 
among energy transportation and use, environmental protection, economy and 
politics.  
Recent hydrocarbon findings in our neighborhood have stirred up a lot of tension 
in a troubled historical period, especially for our country. This is one of the reasons 
why I was motivated to investigate a subject, so closely related to our present but also 
to our future. Having in mind that prosperity and happiness are things that every 
human being deserves, I acknowledge the fact that power plays a crucial role, even 
towards the most simple and everyday pursuits of each and every one of us. 
Therefore, I profoundly believe that instead of fearing power we should try to 
interpret it. Using the methodology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis, I have come 
across a very useful tool that helps the researcher understand the essence and the 
ways of power.  
Energy geopolitics, I believe, shall enter our lives more decisively in the near 
future. Our need to create and live leads us to consume; unfortunately, this is a very 
difficult equation to solve. Nevertheless, understanding politics and energy is a 
fundamental prerequisite for anyone who wants to deeply comprehend our times and 
maybe influence the world a little bit, towards something better. This dissertation 
attempted to investigate these aspects of the truth, at least as I behold them. The 
cooperation in the Mediterranean is a prospect that I wish for. I hope that the 
redistribution of power investigated in this study, will shape a better future not only 
for the people of the Mediterranean but for the whole world.  The extensive literature 
review and the findings of this research have generated some interesting ideas for 
further research and self-reflection. I hope that this paper contributes to the ongoing 
discussion of such issues in the most constructive and motivational way.
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Introduction 
The structure of modern society is based on intense energy use. This fact renders 
energy policy an imperative for states; therefore, energy security is a fundamental 
objective for domestic and foreign policy. In a constantly evolving and complex world, 
every society seeks to obtain access to affordable, stable and uninterrupted availability 
of energy sources (IEA, 2018). Consequently, control over energy resources and 
transportation has become the holy grail of international business and politics, as 
Hughes and Lipscy (2013), Česnakas (2010), Fernandes and Rodriguez (2017) and 
Vidakis and Baltos (2015) have underlined. The subject matter to be discussed in this 
dissertation shall be based οn the study of planned natural gas flows via the EastMed 
pipeline in the South-Eastern Mediterranean and the interactions among the basic 
political actors in the region.  
The Mediterranean Sea is an almost landlocked sea that connects 3 continents, 
bounded by Europe on the north, Asia on the east and Africa on the South, providing 
exit to the Atlantic Ocean through the Strait of Gibraltar. It is a composite of several 
minor seas with different characteristics that covers an area of 2,5 million km2 and it is 
naturally divided in two basins, the West and the East, by the Strait of Sicily (Semple, 
1931, pp. 59-62). The South-Eastern Mediterranean region or Levantine Sea is situated 
in the larger and more complex East Basin (1,6 million km2); it borders the Aegean Sea 
and Greece to the northwest, Turkey to the north, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Gaza Strip 
to the east, and Egypt and Libya to the south; Cyprus is the largest island in this region 
(Semple, 1931, pp. 59-62). 
Since ancient times, the East Basin has been an area of great importance – due to 
its connection with the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf – that permitted cultural transfers 
from Asia and the Orient to the West Basin and from there to every surrounding shore 
of the Mediterranean (Semple, 1931, pp. 59-62). The eastern trade interchanges and 
contact with the old Mesopotamian states, along with the exchange of agricultural and 
industrial products and methods contributed to the creation of a thriving 
Mediterranean civilization, which constitutes the cradle of the modern world (Semple, 
1931, pp. 59-62).       
[2] 
Natural Gas (NG) has an increasingly important role to play in the future, as a 
“cleaner” energy source compared to other fossil fuels, and since current technology 
permits its effective exploitation. Newly discovered and proven NG reserves in the 
South-Eastern Mediterranean (over 35 tcf off the shores of Cyprus and Israel) may 
change the region’s status from being a long-term importer to a net exporter (Andoura 
& Koranyi, 2014, p. 9).  These discoveries have created alternative strategic options for 
the states of this region and push them towards redirecting their energy and foreign 
policies.  
The main aspects of EU’s long-term energy security policy are: the establishment 
of a competitive and integrated energy market; the reduction of external dependency 
on particular suppliers by diversification of energy sources; the acceleration of the 
Southern Gas Corridor; the transition to a low carbon economy; the coordination of 
national energy policies over energy mix or energy infrastructure towards a common 
foreign policy; and the increase of indigenous production, as well as the development 
of energy technologies and infrastructure (European Commission, 2014). In this 
context, Italy sustains a higher share of NG in its energy mix, compared to the EU 
average, a considerable increase in its consumption since 2005, but also a moderate 
dependency on gas imports compared to the EU (5,7 to 12% until 2015); net import 
dependency has decreased during this period suggesting an improvement in Italy’s 
energy security, due to renewable energy use (European Commission, 2017). 
Greece and Cyprus, as extremely dependent on energy imports – 71,5% for 
Greece (oil/gas and solid fuels) and 97,7% for Cyprus (gas) in 2015 –  are highly 
motivated to diversify their energy sources, according to the respective Energy Union 
factsheets (European Commission, 2017); moreover, as EU member states, their 
energy security targets are aligned with those of the EU’s policy agenda and 
particularly with the promotion of the Southern Gas Corridor and of domestic 
production increase, which shall enhance their security of supply (Tsakiris, 2014, pp. 
10-13). Greece is pursuing international gas projects to secure supply, planning to 
establish itself as a gas hub in the region (IEA, 2017, pp. 13-22). As Tsakiris underlines, 
Greece’s emergence as a transit state for Cypriot and Israeli gas to the European 
markets will be beneficial for both Cyprus and Israel (2014, p. 11).  
[3] 
As cited by Karakasis (2015, p. 10), “a country’s ability to access energy supplies 
and the ways in which it uses energy determine the state of its national security”. Until 
2010, Turkey has been an invaluable ally to Israel, which had a history of conflict with 
its Arab neighbors for decades; due to this alliance, Israel managed to avoid regional 
isolation and strengthened its national security (Inbar, 2011, p. 133). In addition, 
Israel’s shortness of indigenous energy resources resulted in its overwhelming 
dependence on imports (100% oil imports dependence in 2015); consequently, to 
cover its increasing needs, indigenous production and diversification of energy mix and 
sources, as well as a strategic petroleum reserve constitute vital necessities for Israel’s 
energy and national security (Bahgat, 2011) (US Energy Information Administration, 
2016).  
Constantly growing energy demand in Turkey and Egypt forces them to seek for 
alternative supply options. Turkey, covering only the 26% of its needs from domestic 
sources, aims to enhance its energy security activities; thus, diversification of oil/gas 
routes and sources along with an increase of indigenous and renewable energy 
participation in the energy mix are of the essence (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2011). Turkey’s privileged geostrategic position and possession of 
critical infrastructure for Asia-to-Europe energy flows offer many opportunities and 
responsibilities, in terms of energy security, enhancing its pursued role as hub for 
eastern gas distribution to Europe (Andoura & Koranyi, 2014, p. 12).  In order to 
strengthen its role in regional energy cooperation, Turkey joined the Energy 
Community as an observer in 2006; its participation in existing oil/gas projects such as 
the SCP, BTE and ITG pipelines or in ongoing TANAP and TAP pipelines aimed to deliver 
gas from the Caspian region and the Middle East to Europe – within the context of the 
Southern Gas Corridor – promoting Turkey’s international role and national energy 
policy (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). 
Egypt, although a previously important gas exporter in the region, has faced a 
decline of proved oil and gas reserves in previous years (Atlam & Rapiea, 2016, p. 684) 
and gas flows to Israel (El Arish-Ashkelon pipeline), Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey 
(Arab Gas pipeline) have been blocked following the “Arab Spring” in 2011 
(Tagliapietra, 2017, pp. 13-15). Domestic political disagreement led to the termination 
of exports to Israel, whereas the interruption of energy transit to other Arab countries 
[4] 
was the outcome of terrorist attacks by Jihadists and Bedouin Islamists in the Sinai 
Peninsula; furthermore, political turmoil resulted in the decrease of upstream 
investments and production and in massive power cuts; hence, Egypt started to import 
gas until late 2018, rendering its export infrastructure obsolete (Tagliapietra, 2017, pp. 
13-15) (Reuters, 2018); because of an ill-diversified energy mix, imbalance of oil 
demand and supply, low diversity of oil import sources, low investments, obsolete 
infrastructure and terrorism, Egypt is vulnerable to geopolitical risks and energy supply 
disruptions, facing severe energy security challenges (Atlam & Rapiea, 2016, p. 684). 
Considering the import dependency of these states primarily on Russia and the 
Middle East, it is unsurprising that these new reserves tend to transform the 
geopolitical landscape and regional balance of power (Andoura & Koranyi, 2014, p. 9). 
Moreover, under the scope of Spykman’s (2004) Rimland Theory, US policy aims at a 
higher EU energy independence and American control over the area. EU intends to 
diversify external supplies, considering its dependence on Russian gas imports (39%), 
and to create a Mediterranean gas hub in Southern Europe (European Commission, 
2014, p. 15).  
Also, due to Turkey’s new Islamist reorientation and its alignment with Russia, 
which enhances Russia’s ability to penetrate the Middle East – causing the loss of an 
important buffer from this disordered region for Europe –, the Israeli-Turkish strategic 
partnership has deteriorated (Inbar, 2011, pp. 135-139). Thus, Israel has begun to seek 
alternative transit paths for its energy resources to the West. Finally, Egypt, with its 
new major Zohr NG field discovered in 2015 and its choice to keep a distance from 
Turkey and Russian infiltration efforts, constitutes an invaluable asset for Israeli 
strategy (Mazis, 2018, pp. 21-22).     
“The EastMed pipeline belongs to the European Program ‘Connecting Europe 
Facility’ (CEF)” (Mazis, 2018, p. 27). According to the certified resources in the 
Levantine basin and the EEZ of Cyprus, this pipeline could eventually supply the 
international markets with 30 bcm/year (Mazis, 2018, p. 27). Therefore, Cyprus has 
proved to be a precious ally of Israel and their new policy agenda. Greece’s close ties 
to Cyprus and the optimistic estimations about its NG reserves in Herodotus basin, 
combined with EU’s intentions and US aspirations, may shape a different future for the 
[5] 
region (Mazis, 2018, pp. 51-53). Thus, the proposed dissertation hypothesis is that 
Greece has a tremendous chance to strengthen its geopolitical potential in the region. 
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1. Literature Review 
This chapter presents an overview of the international literature, regarding the 
subject of this research. It includes information about the EastMed project and its role, 
exploitation options for NG resources of the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
geopolitical and security implications arising from recent developments. 
1.1. The EastMed Pipeline project 
The EastMed pipeline is an ambitious project that aims to connect the Eastern 
Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources to Greece via Cyprus and Crete and further on 
to the European gas markets (IGI Podeidon, 2015). According to IGI Poseidon (2015), 
the Greek-Italian Joint Venture that has undertaken the project, the main benefits of 
EastMed’s realization are the following: a) enhancement of Europe’s gas security of 
supply due to diversification of counterparts, routes and sources; b) development of 
indigenous EU resources such as the Greek and Cypriot offshore gas reserves; c) 
establishment of a South Mediterranean Gas Hub.  
The current project design consists of a 1.900 km pipeline with initial 
transportation capacity of 10 bcm/y and a cost estimate of over €6 billion, constituting 
the biggest and longest undersea pipeline in the world;  thus, the offshore gas reserves 
of the Levantine Basin will be feeding Italy, South-Eastern European countries and the 
rest of Europe via Greece, in conjunction with the Poseidon and IGB pipelines as 
depicted in Map 1 (IGI Podeidon, 2015) (Energy Press, 2017). IGI Poseidon’s PRE-FEED 
studies that were concluded in 2016 have undoubtedly indicated that the EastMed 
project is technically feasible, economically viable with reduced costs in relation to 
alternative import projects to EU and complementary to other export options (IGI 
Podeidon, 2015).   
The South-Eastern Mediterranean lies at the intersection of 3 continents: Europe, 
Asia and Africa. It constituted a highly significant area for the Old World which, despite 
the gradual shift of power from the Eastern to Western Hemisphere after the 
discovery of the Americas, retained its importance until today (Spykman, 2004). 
Spykman (2004), suggests that the South-Eastern Mediterranean is situated in the 
Rimland region, between the Heartland (the continental power of Russia) and the 
[7] 
Maritime Powers (predominantly USA); Rimland’s role is to function as a “containment 
belt” between the continental and maritime powers as in Map 2 (Spykman, 2004, p. 
103). He considered the Eurasian littoral areas to be the key of global control (Map 3) 
due to their demographics, natural resources, industrial production and use of internal 
sea roads; consequently, these are the areas where the majority of conflicts take place 
(Spykman, 2004). Disputing Sir Halford Mackinder’s view of his Heartland Theory, 
Spykman proposed that: “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia 
controls the destinies of the world” (Spykman, 2004, p. 107).   
The EastMed project is incubated at a region adjacent to the Middle East and 
North Africa, where multiple tensions and conflicts unfold; international energy 
strategies have determined its fate during the past century, whilst states with 
abundant natural resources and cultural or political rivalries tried to strengthen their 
position, having to confront or integrate interventions of powerful international actors 
(Alobeid, et al., 2018). Conflicts such as the Cypriot question, the Israeli-Lebanese 
border dispute, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab uprisings 
and the Syrian war have shaped the international relations of the Levant (Darbouche, 
et al., 2012, pp. 6-8).  
The main international poles of power to exercise influence over the region are 
US-NATO, the EU and Russia. In international scientific literature, many authors have 
addressed the regional geopolitical changes and politics related to the newly 
discovered hydrocarbon reserves. Relevant aspects like energy security, energy 
markets, investments, regional security and stability architecture have been discussed 
for instance by: (Kovacevic, 2017); (Gavouneli, 2015); (Gandara, 2007); (Tagliapietra & 
Zachmann, 2016); (Henderson, 2013); (Lesser, et al., 2018); (Giamouridis & Tsafos, 
2015); (Hafner, et al., 2012); (Pitatzis, 2015); (Dogru & Reginbogin, 2017); 
(Giannakopoulos, 2016); (Litsas & Tziampiris, 2016); (Horst, et al., 2016); (Roinioti, 
2014); (Tagliapietra, 2017); (Lahn, et al., 2009); (Ruble, 2015); (Elias, 2016); (Česnakas, 
2010); (Bindenagel, et al., 2017); (Nopens, 2013); (Dagoumas & Flouros, 2017); 
(Colombo & Sartori, 2014); (Aoun, 2015); (Özgür, 2017); (Gürel & Le Cornu, 2013); 
(Günaydın, 2014). 
[8] 
1.2. Alternative exploitation and transit options 
Karbuz and Baccarini (2017, pp. 3-5) underline that the exploitation and export of 
hydrocarbon resources in the region involve immense technical, administrative, legal, 
political and security challenges; issues such as infrastructure, financing and cost 
determine the feasibility of options, considering the various political and legal barriers 
that emerge; nevertheless, governmental policies in the Levant have not yet 
succeeded in developing the appropriate long-term vision for their optimal use. 
Various authors discuss these issues and emphasize the significance of resolving critical 
political and legal disputes or conflicts threatening regional security, and choosing 
optimum monetization options and export routes, since companies involved in the 
exploitation will proceed only if profitable commercialization of resources is ensured 
(Karbuz & Baccarini, 2017, pp. 2-3). Substantial emerging issues are the “LNG vs 
Pipeline” question, the clashing claims over the ownership of resources and the 
demarcation of maritime borders, as well as the economic, diplomatic and defensive 
initiatives taken by states (Karbuz & Baccarini, 2017, pp. 3-5) (Manolis & Loverdos, 
2013, pp. 21-22) (Günaydın, 2014) (Mazis, 2018) (Mazis, 2017) (ElBassoussy, 2018).  
Manolis and Loverdos (2013, pp. 21-22) describe the advantages and 
disadvantages between the LNG and pipeline options, regarding energy 
transportation; LNG operations offer flexibility, expansion opportunities, export 
versatility, volume adaptation and client base diversification, while being vulnerable to 
external threats and having high liquefaction costs; on the other hand, pipeline 
transportation is also vulnerable to threats but offers more competitive commercial 
tariffs, while it’s possible to ensure the participation of European buyers via long-term 
contracts – due to lower dependence on Asian multi-supplier markets – enhancing, 
thus, investment viability. However, in case of adequate gas volumes, the mutual 
operation of LNG and pipeline transportation would provide additional benefits; 
ultimately, any decision about markets and infrastructure is subject to national 
security necessities and security risks (Manolis & Loverdos, 2013, pp. 21-22).  
Karbuz and Baccarini (2017, pp. 3-5) cite, as the most critical challenges of legal 
and political nature, the disputable claims of ownership of resources and the 
delimitation of maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel or between Cyprus, 
[9] 
Turkey and the self-proclaimed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; these conflicts, 
besides the Israeli-Palestinian Authority dispute over the Gaza Marine field, have been 
also described explicitly by: (Karagiannis, 2016, pp. 7-9); (El-Katiri & El-Katiri, 2014, pp. 
8-17); (Nimrod, et al., 2018, pp. 32-59); (Giannakopoulos, 2016); (Örmeci, 2015, pp. 
325-335); (Mazis, 2018); (Schmoll, 2016); (Inbar, 2014) (Karakasis, 2015). In Maps 4 
and 5 the agreed delimitation of the region’s EEZs and Cyprus’ EEZ and offshore 
exploration blocks are depicted respectively.  
Until the Zohr discovery (2015), expectations – a 5% estimate of total EU gas 
imports – that the major Levant neo-reserves (Table 1) would constitute a reliable 
alternative supply for European energy markets were not optimistic, due to economic 
viability, financial, political and technical drawbacks (Sartori, et al., 2016, pp. 2-4) 
(Carlson, 2016, pp. 68-72) (Günaydın, 2014, pp. 4-10). Zohr’s impact on the region’s 
revaluation was high, because of its proximity to the Aphrodite and Leviathan deposits 
(Map 6) and Egypt’s LNG infrastructure; a cooperative exploitation of resources would 
lead to economies of scale and to competitive gas export infrastructure development 
(Tagliapietra, 2017, p. 26).  
 
Table 1: Major Gas discoveries in the South-Eastern Mediterranean (Ellinas, et al., 2016, p. 6). 
Gas-field 
Probable Reserves 
(bcm) 
Discovery Date Status 
Tamar-Israel 280 2009 Producing 
Leviathan-Israel 620 2010 Pursuing gas sales 
Aphrodite-Cyprus 128 2011 Pursuing gas sales 
Zohr-Egypt 845 2015 Being developed 
 
Sartori et al. (2016, pp. 11-12) argue that the same factors, as above, hampering 
full exploitation of resources in the Levant basin, also limit the sustainable export 
options to regional and international markets. They also identify four main export 
routes (Map 7) for these resources (2016, pp. 11-12):  
[10] 
1. Intraregional trade, which implies the improvement of relations among Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine and the conclusion of export 
agreements, something that has partly already happened, to ensure further 
exploitation of Israeli offshore resources (Karbuz & Baccarini, 2017, p. 3); a 
bilateral agreement has been also signed between Cyprus and Egypt in 
September 2018 (European Institute of Management and Finance, 2018). The 
effectiveness of this choice depends on a variety of political factors. 
2. The Turkish route, which essentially refers to the transportation of Cypriot and 
Israeli gas to Turkey via a subsea pipeline, possibly joining the Southern Gas 
Corridor (SCP, TANAP and TAP pipelines) and reaching European markets (Map 
8). This option is a geographically and economically logical export choice; 
however, political drawbacks render it a difficult one and more possible in case 
of full Turkish-Israeli relations restoration and of a final settlement of the 
Cyprus question.  
3. The EastMed pipeline route, which will provide Cypriot and Israeli gas via 
Greece to the European markets. This solution is supported by the EU, which is 
co-funding the project; moreover, it would offer producers access to a secure 
and profitable market, away from the higher risks of LNG markets, and 
enhance the South-East European cooperation. Its feasibility (IGI Podeidon, 
2015), although questioned in the past, seems now certain but its 
implementation could prove to be challenging because of Turkey’s 
unpredictable reactions (Karbuz & Baccarini, 2017, p. 3) 
4. The Egyptian LNG hub, which implies the establishment of Egypt as a regional 
gas hub, by using 2 of its already existing liquefaction facilities; the positive 
economic perspective of this solution made it very promising since in the past, 
the realization of any Cypriot and Israeli LNG terminals has been set aside due 
to economic reasons. Zohr’s gas surplus would allow Egypt’s export capacity to 
be connected with the other fields, creating thus a gas hub. However, Cyprus 
currently participates in the CyprusGas2EU PCI program and is planning to 
construct a Floating Storage & Regasification Unit (FSRU) in Vassilikos Bay, 
near Limassol; this terminal is expected to enable security of supply also for 
the EastMed pipeline (Cyprus Gas 2 EU, 2018). A major factor that 
[11] 
counterbalances the economic feasibility of the Egyptian option is Israel’s 
concerns about its export dependency on Egypt, which would have then 
become the region’s energy focal point. 
The main export alternatives, structure and trade-offs for the Eastern 
Mediterranean are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Prospects for bringing gas-to-market in the Eastern Mediterranean (Baconi, 2017). 
Options/Issues Structure 
Technical 
Issues 
Commercial 
Issues 
Political 
Issues 
Cyprus LNG 
export 
LNG terminal onshore or 
offshore Cyprus.    
Cyprus – Israel 
FLNG/LNG 
Joint LNG export plant for 
both Aphrodite and 
Leviathan. 
   
Israel pipeline 
to Turkey 
Pipeline from Leviathan 
to Turkey through Cypriot 
EEZ. 
   
Cyprus – Israel 
EastMed 
pipeline 
Pipeline from Leviathan/ 
Aphrodite to Greece.    
Egypt LNG 
export 
 
Ikdu and Damietta 
exports from Zohr. 
 
   
Egypt – Cypriot 
LNG export 
Pipeline from Aphrodite 
to Ikdu. LNG exports from 
Aphrodite and Zohr. 
   
Egypt regional 
hub 
Pipelines from Israel and 
Cyprus to Egypt. LNG 
exports from Aphrodite, 
Leviathan and Zohr.  
   
 
1.3. Energy resources and geopolitical implications in the Eastern Mediterranean 
The basic question that arises is whether the Levantine neo-reserves, having a 
high economic and geostrategic importance, shall constitute a springboard to closer 
regional cooperation or potential future conflicts (El-Katiri & El-Katiri, 2014, pp. 1-20). 
[12] 
Some authors focus on the cooperation perspectives, particularly in commercial and 
investment viability terms or in relation to long-term energy security and prosperity, 
calling for action toward this direction (Sartori, et al., 2016) (Carlson, 2016, pp. 67-78) 
(Adamo & Garonna, 2009) (Ellinas, et al., 2016, p. 28) (Karbuz & Baccarini, 2017) 
(Giannakopoulos, 2016, pp. 82-83) (Tagliapietra, 2017). Others focus more on the 
developing antagonisms among international poles of power and among regional 
states, highlighting the geopolitical elements that could lead to potential conflicts 
(Mazis, 2013a) (Mazis, 2013b) (Mazis, 2013c) (Mazis, 2013d) (Mazis, 2014) (Mazis, 
2017) (Mazis, 2018) (Karagiannis, 2016, pp. 9-11) (Ehteshami, et al., 2017) 
(ElBassoussy, 2018) (Koranyi, 2018) (Widdershoven, 2017) (Hoffmann, 2018).  
Of course, addressing such a dilemma with certainty is erroneous. As Karbuz and 
Baccarani (2017, p. 5) stress, converging economic interests are evidently a strong 
incentive for the accomplishment of political agreements between countries, due to 
support by civil society and economic agents towards governments’ actions. According 
to Karagiannis (2016, p. 10), the optimism expressed by many experts about 
cooperation possibilities lies in their liberal view of international affairs, implying that 
economic benefits from hydrocarbon exports shall result in political conflict resolution; 
however, various historical examples have proved that such benefits often result in 
ethnocentrism and economic nationalism. Thus, many pipeline projects have been led 
to failure in the past, due to the unwillingness of states to concede territory or be 
dependent on hostile neighbours, diminishing any further cooperation potentials 
(Karagiannis, 2016, p. 10).   
Cropsey and Brown (2014, pp. 13-15) point out the two possible security 
strategies that may be followed in the region: a) the national self-strengthening 
strategy and b) the collective strategy aiming to promote regional security; they also 
stress that these strategies are not necessarily irreconcilable, but they may prove to be 
inter-supportive. Since the latest discoveries, great powers didn’t stay aloof from the 
game; US, the EU and Russia tried to establish a foothold in these new gas fields 
(ElBassoussy, 2018, p. 74). Iran and China also attempted to increase their influence in 
the Mediterranean (Cropsey & Brown, 2014, pp. 28-32) (Duchâtel & Duplaix, 2018). 
Russia tried to benefit from the nationally oriented strategy of the region’s states, 
amid ongoing disputes, by signing energy agreements with Israeli rivals Lebanon, Syria 
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and the Palestinians after 2013 or with Egypt and even Israel itself, in order to obtain a 
share of their exploited gas fields; Israel has opened the door to Russian cooperation in 
its effort to protect its facilities against the Hezbollah threat and secure an alternative 
export option for its gas, in case of agreement annulments with Turkey and Cyprus 
(ElBassoussy, 2018, pp. 79-83).  
Both the US and the EU on the other hand are advocates for the cooperation 
strategy, which serves their aligned interests; the emergence of an Eastern 
Mediterranean Gas Corridor, on the condition that the ownership question is resolved, 
shall accelerate private investment and fulfil their objectives (Karagiannis, 2016, p. 11) 
(Tagliapietra, 2013). Their current foreign policy is aiming to stabilize this troubled 
region, as previous initiatives have demonstrated, e.g. NATO’s “Mediterranean 
Dialogue”, the “Union for the Mediterranean”, the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” 
and the “Energy Union” (Larrabee, et al., 1998) (Union For the Mediterranean, 2018) 
(European Commission, 2015). NATO’s objective to fortify its south-eastern flank 
against the emerging Russian penetration and promote cooperation with the EU is 
sabotaged by the Turkish-Cypriot conflict and Turkey’s vetoes against Cyprus’ 
accession to international organizations or to the “Partnership for Peace” initiative, 
which eventually would lead to full NATO membership; in such event, Turkey would be 
possibly led to withdraw from Cyprus (Cropsey, 2015, pp. 46-47). 
Turkey’s role as a valuable constant for NATO’s regional security order and as a 
precious ally for Israel and the US has nowadays degraded; humanitarian crisis, war 
and Islamic militancy have destabilized the region (Cropsey & Brown, 2014, p. 36). The 
unsuccessful US strategic policy in the Middle East has endangered the long-term 
security of the EU, Turkey and Israel; the Mediterranean energy revolution provides 
the US with a chance to follow an “allies-first policy” in order to enforce and widen the 
regional liberal order and resolve disputes among its allies; the democratic governance 
and policy orientation of Israel, Greece and Cyprus is valuable for such aspirations 
(Cropsey & Brown, 2014, pp. 33-35). US strategy is therefore directed by 4 main 
determinants: a) Gas as an access for peace and the preservation of Israel’s security, 
either by diplomatic incentives or military cooperation, b) Gas as a tool for 
reconciliation between allies via diplomacy (e.g. Israeli-Turkish rapprochement),           
c) Attainment of economic gains and interests through American companies’ control 
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(e.g. Noble Energy’s presence in Aphrodite’s block 12) over gas investments and d) 
Promotion of European energy security through diversification (ElBassoussy, 2018, p. 
82) (De Micco, 2014, p. 20) (Johnson, et al., 2015). El-Katiri and El-Katiri (2014, p. 2) 
note that “Israel, Cyprus and Turkey are key strategic US allies” while Egypt, Syria and 
Lebanon are also important for European and American interests.  
The EU’s strategy towards the South-Eastern Mediterranean gas exploitation aims 
to increase energy security, sustainability and competitiveness; this target is based on 
5 interrelated and mutually-reinforcing objectives: a) Energy security, solidarity and 
trust; b) A fully integrated European energy market; c) Energy efficiency contributing to 
moderation of demand; d) Decarbonising the economy; e) Research, Innovation and 
Competitiveness (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). The increasing importance of gas 
in the EU energy mix and Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2006 made energy 
security a pivotal issue for the Union; high dependency on third countries (Russia, 
Algeria, Norway) turned Cyprus into a valuable asset, as a link for Israeli gas flows; 
thus, diversification of imports away from Russia became a fundamental policy choice 
(De Micco, 2014, p. 21) (Stergiou, 2017, p. 103).  
The main drivers of the EU’s intentions are: a) Diversification of energy-attaining 
sources by exploration, b) Effective participation in the exploration and development of 
gas fields and c) Support to common NG exploration projects (ElBassoussy, 2018, pp. 
75-79). To this end, in 2012, the Commission endorsed the Eastern Mediterranean 
corridor vision by including the Euro-Asia Interconnector, the FLNG Facility in Cyprus 
and the EastMed pipeline on the list of ‘Projects of Common Interest’ (2014-2020), 
regardless of the strong Turkish political opposition and other deterring issues such as 
lack of investment, high costs, political uncertainty and technical difficulties at the time 
(De Micco, 2014, p. 21) (Stratakis & Pelagidis, 2018). Apart from loosening Russian 
influence over the EU, such policy creates also an area of common interest for the 
neighbouring parties of the region, while dividing the economic gains among 
international actors, since Israeli resources are left on the hands of American and 
Israeli companies (ElBassoussy, 2018, p. 79).  
NATO’s strategic surrounding of Russia, in accordance with the Rimland Theory, 
resulted in Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and its military presence in the Syrian war 
(Mazis, 2017, p. 28) (Sazonov, et al., 2016). Stergiou (2017) argues that for Russia, the 
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Mediterranean constitutes an additional field of competition with the West; the new 
“Cold War” Russian strategy comprises two pillars: energy and military involvement; its 
projection of power aims to undermine NATO’s role in the regional security 
architecture and consolidate itself as an alternative security provider in the region. He 
also underlines that Russia tried to fill any security and economic vacuums, retaining 
its “hegemonic position as a traditional energy supplier of the West”; recent gas 
discoveries though, have given Washington the opportunity to pursue its aim to 
impede Moscow’s tactic of exerting influence on Europe, by using its gas exports. 
Rearrangement of regional power balance also gave Russia the chance, to re-establish 
its defence and energy cooperation with nearly every state in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, acquiring a strategic position that renders itself calculable by other 
players in any future energy developments (Stergiou, 2017) (Plakoudas, 2015).  
Russia’s antagonistic view of Turkey, concerning its interests in Central Asia and 
Caucasus, did not prevent the two parts from forging an alliance, regardless of Turkey’s 
exercise of its geostrategic potential to emerge as a regional power after the USSR’s 
collapse; Turkey’s goal of becoming the primary non-Russian transport route and 
regional energy hub was not enough to prevent this development, after the 2003 de 
facto establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq, which affected significantly the 
American-Turkish relations (Stergiou, 2017) (Çeviköz, 2016) (Kisasik & Kaya, 2017) 
(Gokırmak, 2017) (Tagliapietra, 2014). Basic goal of Russia’s policy regarding Turkey is 
its strategic separation from the West; moreover, Cyprus consists a key policy 
component for Kremlin, which tries to protect the island’s sovereignty and neutrality 
along with Russian inbound and outbound capital flows and avoid its pro-NATO 
militarization (Stergiou, 2017, pp. 107-112).   
As Mazis (2018, pp. 15-20) describes, control over Cyprus is a strategic goal of the 
Turkish foreign policy; therefore, Turkey questions the contour of the Cypriot EEZ in 
view of these discoveries, to this end. Turkey’s ultimate aim is to gain control of the 
Levantine Basin deposits in cooperation with Russia and Iran, acting essentially as a 
“Trojan Horse” for the anti-Western revisionist powers; control of supply routes by 
Moscow and Tehran would render the EU fully dependent on them, undermining the 
energy security and regional control of the Euro-Atlantic bloc (Mazis, 2018, pp. 20-21) 
(McNamara, et al., 2010) (Oğurlu, 2012). The influence of the anti-Western bloc could 
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expand, if Russian and Turkish infiltration in Egypt ended up successful; nevertheless, 
the Egyptian government has not consented so far to this rapprochement (Mazis, 
2018, p. 21) (Grigoriadis, 2014).  
Due to Turkey’s support of the Palestinians and its ambivalent alliance with Iran, 
the Turkish-Israeli relations started to deteriorate gradually since 2000, following their 
strong ties in the ‘90s, damaging their strategic nexus and US position in the region 
(Mazis, 2018, pp. 35-38) (Inbar, 2001, p. 61). Despite the Turkish efforts for 
rapprochement with Israel and the restoration of their diplomatic relations since June 
2016, further crises occurred (e.g. expulsion of diplomatic delegates in May 2018) that 
rendered any future strategic collaboration difficult and posed serious barriers to US 
efforts for convergence (Mazis, 2018, p. 35) (Efron, 2018). This situation develops 
contrary to the will of various political and economic stakeholders on both sides, in 
favour of this rapprochement, which promote the construction of an Israeli-Turkish 
pipeline (Leviathan-Ceyhan) and the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements; 
nevertheless, the feasibility of such an endeavour is contested by some sceptics for 
political, financial and technical reasons (Efron, 2018, pp. 15-23).   
Inbar (2014, p. 12) mentions that stability in the Eastern Mediterranean is fragile 
due to US receding forces, while Europe is unable to fill the political vacuum; 
additionally, Russia is upgrading its military presence and an Islamist threat is always 
existent; Turkey on the other hand cannot be considered a committed western ally, 
amidst the increasing access of Iran to the region, the negative effect of failed states 
and energy resources competition, which intensify destabilizing tensions. He also 
stresses that despite Israel’s upgraded strategic position, Jerusalem identifies a 
deteriorating environment in the region; Turkish potency and increased Russian 
presence constitute a threat to Israeli interests and are detrimental to the 
accomplishment of two basic Israeli aspirations, i.e., freedom of maritime routes for its 
trade and security for its gas fields (Inbar, 2014, p. 12).  
Some authors like Tanchum (2015) consider the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement 
significant for regional stability and very probable, due to their mutual interest against 
the expansion of the Iranian sphere of influence, while others like Mazis (2018, p. 66), 
Koranyi (2018) and Inbar (2014) stress that the odds for such a development are slim. 
Moreover, the opinion that this rapprochement could offer a unique opportunity for a 
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just and lasting solution to the Cyprus conflict, since any future pipeline connecting 
Israeli deposits to Turkey would pass through the Cypriot EEZ, has been expressed by 
some authors (Tanchum, 2015) (Carlson, 2016) (Ellinas, et al., 2016, p. 19) (Tziarras, 
2015). Efron (2018, pp. 42-43) argues that the US has significant economic and 
geostrategic interests in such a gas project, whilst having strong ties with both Turkey 
(Sunni counterbalance factor) and Israel against the Iranian influence; thus, the US has 
the option to utilize any available leverage over both countries, so that they can 
overcome differences, cooperate and promote regional stability.  
Greece and Cyprus have faced severe economic crises during the past decade; 
Greece received financial assistance by the EU to pull through, while in 2012 Cyprus 
turned to Moscow in the absence of any European aid (Stergiou, 2017, p. 108). Greece, 
as an EU and NATO member, plays a pivotal role in regional security architecture under 
current circumstances; its geopolitical position and ties to Russia, Israel, the Arab 
world and even to Iran shape the country’s significance for an ambitious Europe, 
aspired to hold a key position in the global and regional political scene (Dokos, 2016, p. 
46).  
As Dokos (2016, pp. 45-47) underlines, due to the economic crisis, Greece 
encountered a degradation of its European and regional role, as well as on its 
geopolitical potential by disregarding issues of foreign and security policy; moreover, 
the EU’s poor decision-making underestimated the geopolitical impact of the Cypriot 
crisis or of a probable Grexit and the wisdom of “making an example” of Greece, given 
its geostrategic value in an increasingly fluid European periphery, is disputable. 
However, recent discoveries of Israeli, Cypriot and Greek neo-reserves since 2009 have 
been a game-changer.1 Within a major geopolitical transformation, these three states 
came in conjunction to face the new reality. Mazis (2018, p. 53) stresses also Greece’s 
strong geographical advantage, which allows it to become a core transit country in the 
regional pipeline network to be developed; thus, being part of TAP, Turkish Stream and 
the Vertical Corridor (connecting the Balkans and Eastern Europe), provides the 
opportunity for a crucial geopolitical upgrade. 
                                                 
1 Estimates about the Greek, Cypriot and Israeli reserves: 6 trillion cubic meters of NG and 1,7 billion 
barrels of oil in Greece; 3 trillion cubic meters of NG in Cyprus; 2,5 trillion cubic meters in Israel. See 
Mazis, I. T., 2018. Turkey, Israel, Greece: Reshuffling in the Eastern Mediterranean. Civitas Gentium, 
March, VI(1), p.66. 
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Driven by their common strategic perception of the region, bilateral diplomatic 
relations between Athens and Jerusalem started to improve rapidly since August 2010 
up to this day (Mazis, 2018, p. 38). Turkish-Israeli alienation and aggressive policy 
against Greece and Cyprus, generated the incentive for a closer approach; Israel’s aim 
to attain strategic depth in the Mediterranean Sea and the Greek along with the 
Cypriot objective to protect Nicosia’s legitimate rights in its EEZ, led them to forge a 
tripartite strategic alliance and build up an effective deterrent mechanism against 
Turkey (Mazis & Sotiropoulos, 2016, pp. 602-604). This alliance was developed on a 
diplomatic, military and economic level; several bilateral agreements have been signed 
among the three parties in various fields such as energy, science, technology, culture, 
education, defence and the environment; annual trilateral summits and meetings have 
also been established, while several bilateral or multinational aeronautical and military 
exercises have taken place in an unprecedented scale (Mazis, 2018, pp. 38-47). 
Similarly, another tripartite strategic alliance has been built among Greece, Cyprus and 
Egypt since 2013, in the prospect of potential exports to Egypt, which permitted a 
Jerusalem-Cairo rapprochement and was in opposition to Turkey as well (Tanchum, 
2015, p. 3). 
The prospects of the two tripartite alliances have been verified by the recent 
Greek-Egyptian and Greek-Israeli defence cooperation agreements signed in 2018 
(Hellenic National Defence General Staff, 2018); the multinational exercises “Nemesis-
2018” and “Bright Star” that took place in October and September 2018 (Hellenic 
National Defence General Staff, 2018); the joint declarations of the “5th Cyprus-Greece-
Israel Summit” and the “6th Cyprus-Egypt-Greece Summit” held in Beersheba, on 20th 
December 2018, and in Crete, on 10 October 2018 (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2018) (Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Interior, 2018). The commitment 
of Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Israel to the EastMed Pipeline Project was confirmed by 
the conclusion of an MoU in Nicosia, on 5 December 2017, in which the objective of 
signing an IGA among the parties in 2018 was expressed (Republic of Cyprus, Ministry 
of Energy, Trade, Industry and Tourism, 2017).  
This objective was once more verified by the joint statement of the 5th trilateral 
Summit in Beersheba in which the Heads of States and Government of Israel, Cyprus 
and Greece have reconfirmed their support and commitment to the EastMed Pipeline 
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Project; additionally, they have announced an agreement on the text of the 
Intergovernmental Agreement to be signed, after being reviewed by Italy and the 
European Commission, in order to promote and implement the project; moreover, 
they have underlined their intention to sign this IGA soon, maybe in the first quarter of 
2019, as the Greek Energy Minister Georgios Stathakis has stated in December 2018 
(Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018) (Cyprus Mail Online, 2018).   
These tripartite summits and meetings of officials resulted in various initiatives for 
closer energy collaboration in terms of energy security and infrastructure, joint 
projects, trade etc. For instance, an agreement was concluded among the 4 participant 
states about the establishment of a Permanent Secretariat in Nicosia to monitor the 
implementation of joint projects and the creation of the “East Mediterranean Gas 
Forum” for the coordination of NG policies in the region and the promotion of mutual 
benefits among the involved states (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2018) (Egypt Oil and Gas Newspaper, 2018). The first annual meeting of the forum was 
held on January 14 and 15 in Cairo with the participation of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, 
Italy, Israel, Jordan and Palestine (Ahram Online, 2019). 
 1.4. The EastMed project΄s strategic role and regional security architecture 
The geopolitical transformation of the wider region, which has led to the strategic 
alignment of Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, renders the EastMed pipeline a project 
of utmost importance for these states and for regional stability; despite Ankara’s 
efforts, the official Israeli position steers towards this alignment since national security 
is an ultimate priority for Jerusalem and consequently, business interests will not 
dominate (Mazis, 2018, pp. 47-64). Mazis (2018, pp. 48-51) stresses that the 
geopolitical factor of energy contributes to the convergence of the states’ national 
interests and guarantees the long-term dynamic of their strategic partnership; 
moreover, this historic alliance composes a “grid of multipliable power” resulting in 
regional geostrategic balance and political stability, in midst of a geopolitical 
restructuring already taking place. He notes that the “energy geopolitical factor is the 
qualitative dynamic catalyst in this tripartite allied relationship”.  
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The EastMed project constitutes, therefore, the qualitative catalyst for the 
expansion of a lasting Greece-Cyprus-Israel tripartite alliance and contributes to the 
energy mix and supply diversification goals of the EU, while being a geostrategic 
counterpoise to Turkish revisionism (Mazis, 2018, p. 61). Apart from primarily 
enhancing energy security, such a project conveys also individual political benefits to 
all parties: Israel will try to capitalize on its energy exports power and redirect 
European institutions toward a more pro-Israeli position, regarding its conflict with the 
Arabs; Greece and Cyprus will exploit this development to exit their economic 
depression status based on the energy sector, in a region where many companies 
seem willing to invest; Greece may also regain market trust and become an important 
gas hub for Europe; the systemic geopolitical outcome of this enhanced alliance will be 
the rapid upgrade of the parties’ geopolitical status on a peripheral level (Mazis, 2018, 
pp. 59-61) (Stratakis & Pelagidis, 2018, pp. 19-23). Additionally, the Zohr discovery has 
reinforced EastMed’s prospects, since the bulk of the Eastern Mediterranean gas 
production won’t be absorbed by Egypt but, via the EastMed pipeline, will be routed to 
the European markets (Mazis, 2018, p. 66). The aforementioned factors are in favour 
of the project.  
Over the past decade, we have witnessed the gradual deterioration of the US 
regional security architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean subsystem, which was 
based on an alliances regime involving regional powers and was structured mainly 
around the US-Turkey-Israel and US-Egypt-Israel triangles; this architecture started to 
evolve into a limited security regime based on the Greece-Cyprus-Israel and Greece-
Cyprus-Egypt triangles, promoting collective action and multilateral cooperation 
instead of offensive power projection and conflict, on the grounds of mutual interests 
and values (Inbar, 2014, p. 23) (Dokos & Tsakonas, 2018, pp. 17-21) (Arbell, 2014).  
Therefore, as Mazis (2018), Inbar (2014), Efron (2018) and Cropsey (2015) 
describe, Israel and Greece are building a new sub-regional security architecture, with 
the Cyprus-Israel defence cooperation as balancer; this new emerging equilibrium 
causes a geopolitical power shift that facilitates the ramped-up presence of the 
Russian factor in the region and the retreat of the US; nevertheless, this new 
architecture gives the US the opportunity to counterbalance Russian influence, while 
putting the allied parties in a “more favourable position towards their bilateral 
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relations with Turkey” despite its prevailing strength, as Tanchum (2015, p. 13) has 
underlined. Some scholars consider this new limited trilateral security architecture as 
more effective in terms of regional stability, instead of a comprehensive structure, due 
to the variety of relations among states, diverse needs and the plethora of conflicts 
(Sartori, et al., 2016, p. 13) (Mazis, 2018) (Tziarras, 2015) (Tanchum, 2015). The 
overview of the relevant scientific literature implies that, in view of the new 
developments, Greece has the potential to upgrade its regional geostrategic role; to 
this end, the contribution of any planned energy projects is undeniably crucial.  
The required synergies among states and companies for the exploitation of the 
new hydrocarbon resources and the geopolitical benefits for all parties of the trilateral 
alliances are expected to promote regional cooperation and security (Karbuz & 
Baccarini, 2017) (Mazis, 2018). As indicated by recent official statements, such as those 
of the Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz in March 2018 and of the Prime Ministers 
of Greece, Alexis Tsipras, and of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, during the Craiova Forum 
Summit on November 2, 2018, the EastMed Pipeline project is expected to play a 
fundamental role in deepening Greek-Israeli collaboration and enhancing the region’s 
global status in terms of energy geopolitics, whilst the final decision for its construction 
is expected to be made by early 2019 (Bousso, 2018) (State of Israel, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2018) (Papantoniou, 2018).  
On the other hand, Turkey, fearing its exclusion from the exploitation of the 
Mediterranean resources, attempts to counterbalance the effect of the tripartite 
alliances by means of NAVTEXES issuances, to claim supposed rights in Greece’s 
continental shelf or to proceed to seismic research within the Cypriot EEZ; extensive 
military drills such as the forthcoming “Blue Homeland” (February-March 2019) and 
obstructions of gas drill ships; or by officials’ repeated and threatening statements 
such as President Erdoğan’s remarks on November 4, 2018: “we will never allow 
attempts of extorting natural resources in Eastern Mediterranean by excluding us and 
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’” (Nedos, 2018) (Nedos & Syrigos, 2018) 
(Kampouris, 2019) (Daily Sabah, 2019) (Kambas, 2018) (Hürriyet Daily News, 2018). 
These facts are indicative of the ongoing turmoil concerning the exploitation of these 
resources and the political environment in which the EastMed project is to be 
implemented. 
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An extensive research of the available literature on the subject matter was 
conducted, that led to an overall description of political developments in the South-
Eastern Mediterranean, due to the newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the 
region and, especially, in the prospect of the implementation of the EastMed Pipeline 
project, which has already started to influence regional security architecture. The 
emerged shift of power shaped a new security structure and the Greek-Cypriot-Israeli 
“energy coalition” promises a new era of stability in the Mediterranean. This review 
has indicated that the approaches made by various authors about the impact of the 
geopolitical factor under study, are essentially based on theoretical observations and 
assumptions. Therefore, this paper aims to further investigate the redistribution of 
power and Greece’s geopolitical status in the region, using a quantitative approach to 
verify the above-mentioned theoretical conclusions. The methodological tool of 
Systemic Geopolitical Analysis has been selected to elaborate on these conclusions 
from a quantitative perspective. The detailed description of the methodology, research 
stages and limitations follows in Chapter 2.     
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2. Methodology 
The methodological and epistemological aspects of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis 
are presented in this chapter, to provide the theoretical framework for this research.  
2.1. Methodology and Epistemology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis  
The methodological tool selected for this study is that of Systemic Geopolitical 
Analysis, introduced by Ioannis Mazis. According to Domatioti (2017a, pp. 27-28), in 
terms of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis, the researcher: 
1. Examines in depth the chosen topic at 3 system levels (System/Complex, 
Subsystem, Super-system). 
2. Is in position to locate sub-topics and circumstances that lie underneath the 
main topic under study. 
3. May interpret more efficiently previous decisions made on geostrategic level. 
4. Comprehends fully and in detail the geostrategic game at Subsystem level. 
5.  Is fully aware of the overall status of the International System and its Poles of 
International Power on Super-system level.  
The rationale for selecting Systemic Geopolitical Analysis is to use a methodology 
that rejects any subjective, theoretical and vague presentation of the subject 
(Domatioti, 2017a, p. 28). As Mazis (2012, pp. 443-462) suggests, “contemporary 
geopolitical analysis constitutes a methodology of systemic form”; moreover, Systemic 
Geopolitical Analysis is a methodology of systemic form, as Domatioti underlines 
(2017a, p. 28). Another aspect is its objective nature, based on its mathematical 
background, that leads to abstractive and successful predictions and conclusions, 
which may be later used at a different level to support geostrategic synthesis and the 
best possible policy recommendations (Domatioti, 2017a, p. 28).  
International Relations studies the relations among the subjects of international 
politics: States and International Authorities; this field, primarily based on Political 
Science, was developed after WWII to observe the international phenomena, diagnose 
their causes and interpret their effects by examining a plethora of political issues and 
particularly the cause of war (Mazis, 2012). Fundamental concepts of International 
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Relations are: national sovereignty as a characteristic of state; the transnational 
system, thus the politically organized relationships among groups of people within 
certain geographical boundaries; security, freedom, order, justice and prosperity as 
core principles of a transnational system; realism, liberalism, international society and 
international political economy as ideological trends within the frame of International 
Relations; the security dilemma viewing the state simultaneously as a source of 
security and threat; medieval power, modern state power, hegemony and equilibrium 
of forces as ways of political organization and regulation of power distribution (Mazis, 
2012).  
The evolution of International Relations comprises discrete phases shaped by 
debates between groups of experts, that reflected core ideological views and 
arguments characterizing these distinct parties. As Mazis (2012) describes, there have 
been four main debates in this field which are: 
1. First Great Debate: Utopian Liberalism vs Political Realism. 
2. Second Great Debate: Traditional Approach vs Behaviorism 
3. Third Great Debate: Neorealism/Neoliberalism vs Neo-Marxism. 
4. Fourth Great Debate: Established Traditions vs Alternative Approaches.  
Most scholars scarcely ever agree on commonly accepted functional concepts and 
do not base their assumptions on comparable data, since they make use of only parts 
of methodology; they strongly support their school of thought, which is not a ‘scientific 
method’, while “none of these schools of thought proceeds to a mutual self-
contemplation utilizing a tool of a new common rationalism, through an honest 
scientific dispute”; therefore there is a lack of epistemological determination and 
inability to develop a common scientific framework (Mazis, 2012, pp. 201-329) 
(Domatioti, 2017a, p. 30). Mazis (2012, pp. 201-329) shows that the field of 
International Relations consists of theories of various subjects that appertain to the 
vast field of International Relations. The critical aspect here is the predictive capacity, 
which has not been fully addressed yet, as well as the failure to elaborate a General 
Theory of International Relations or at least one Paradigm, collectively accepted by the 
scientific community.  
[25] 
Behaviourism, which emphasized the interpretation of relations through the 
formation of “general laws”, was a methodological revolution in the field and was 
based on assumptions, data collection and scientific knowledge; it proposed the 
elements of ahistoricism and systematicity (Mazis, 2012, pp. 62-79). “In a neo-positivist 
frame, Science is a system of production of valid knowledge when it is based on 
empirical, observable and measurable data to formulate assumptions, create 
explanatory mechanisms and compose theory” (Mazis, 2012, pp. 85-200) (Domatioti, 
2017a, p. 29).  
The three most prominent epistemologists of neo-positivism are Thomas Kuhn, 
Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos. As described by Mazis (2012, pp. 85-200) (Domatioti, 
2017a, pp. 28-32), they proposed that “theory is an axiomatic system of assumptions 
interpreted and legitimized by their empirical results, while Science begins with the 
appearance of the first Paradigm” (Kuhn); moreover, “scientific knowledge is an 
approximate truth to our external world and Science tries to capture a reality beyond 
empirical evidence, while assumptions are subjected to the review of observations and 
experiments” (Popper). “Human knowledge progresses through falsification and, thus, 
a theory cannot be described as scientific unless it could, in principle, be proven false” 
(Popper); finally, “Science is not isolated scientific theories but a competition of 
theories linked to a common core”, with guidelines for the approach of empirical 
examples and scientifically correct approach of irregularities – positive/negative 
heuristic, protective belt – resulting in a research program founded upon a rational set 
of evaluation criteria (Lakatos).  
According to Mazis (2012, pp. 85-200), Imre Lakatos claims that “the basic unit for 
evaluation must be research programs rather than individual theories. A research 
program is a sequence of theories with a remarkable continuity and consists of 
methodological research rules, leading the researcher towards the specific paths to 
follow (positive heuristic) or avoid (negative heuristic)”. The success of this program 
depends on whether it leads to a gradual shift of problems or to degeneration 
(unsuccessful program); furthermore, such a program never resolves all emerging 
issues and the evaluation of interrelated theories is crucial. The essential features of 
the Lakatosian research programs are depicted in Table 3. Mazis (2012, pp. 201-329) 
suggests that this methodology “offers a system of rules based on which an 
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assessment of what is known by the International Relations theory can be made. The 
structural element of the Poles of Power of the International System, especially the 
systemic structure of the international environment, may constitute a resilient part of 
the hard core of the neorealist program”. 
Mazis (2012, pp. 62-79) submits his views from the neo-positive perspective, 
underlining that behaviourism does not constitute a new theory but proposes a 
common scientific dialect and renewed methods, according to the model of exact 
sciences. Moreover, he denotes that interdisciplinary approach of the study of 
international affairs grows stronger, in the context of globalization and concentration 
of international capital in multiple poles of power, reinforced also by technological and 
social progress of international actors. Thus, behaviourism promotes the 
interdisciplinary approach in the study of international affairs in terms of power 
(Domatioti, 2017b, pp. 151-152). 
In terms of epistemology, Geopolitics belongs to Economic Geography which is the 
scientific background of the former and a method of analysis from the spatial 
dimension standpoint (Mazis, 2012, pp. 331-377). Economic Geography is the science 
that examines the following elements: a) human economic activity and intervention in 
geographical space, b) creation and development of individual economic spaces on the 
planet’s surface and c) their interactions and correlations (Mazis, 2012, pp. 331-377). 
Geopolitics is defined as “the analytical geographical method that studies, describes 
and predicts the attitudes and the consequences ensuing from relations between the 
opposing and distinct political practices for the redistribution of power as well as their 
ideological metaphysics, within the framework of the geographical complexes where 
these practices apply” (Mazis, 2012, pp. 331-377) (Mazis, 2002, pp. 43-44). 
Consequently, “the analytical geographical method of Economic Geography by which 
international affairs is being studied from their spatial perspective is Geopolitics and it 
exists, only when a methodology for the analysis of systems of redistribution of power 
from their spatial perspective exists” (Domatioti, 2017a, p. 29).  
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Table 3: Basic features of the Lakatosian Research Programs (Mazis, 2012, pp. 85-200) 
(Domatioti, 2017a, p. 31). 
 
Features of 
Research Programs 
Interpretation 
Hard Core 
It comprises the fundamental assumptions of theory and 
researchers are forbidden to appear contradictory to them. 
Negative Heuristic 
It is crucial to the hard core of the program and inflicts the 
rejection of any modification to it. It shows the path that a 
researcher should follow. If there is a change to the hard core, 
then a new research program is created. 
Positive Heuristic 
It is a set of suggestions and tips (e.g. predictions) that guide the 
researcher. 
Protective Belt 
It empowers the auxiliary proposals/hypotheses to be 
controlled, adapted and replaced when new empirical data 
emerge. The protective belt is the first to be tried out by the 
negative heuristic and is responsible for the necessary tests that 
result in the protection of the hard core of the program. 
 
Based on Lakatos’s concept of research programs, the Lakatosian structure of 
Systemic Geopolitical Analysis (Table 4) comprises the following contents (Mazis, 2012, 
pp. 364-368):  
1. Definition of the fundamental axiomatic assumptions (elements) of the hard 
core of the geopolitical research program. 
2. Definition of the auxiliary hypotheses (elements) of the protective belt of the 
geopolitical research program. 
3. The issue of the positive heuristics of the geopolitical research program. 
4. The elements of the positive heuristics of the geopolitical research program. 
The basic terminology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis and the steps followed by the 
researcher are depicted in Tables 5 and 6. 
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Table 4: The Lakatosian structure of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis (Mazis, 2012, pp. 364-
368). 
 
Contents of the Geopolitical Research Program 
Fundamental 
axiomatic 
assumptions 
of the hard 
core 
1st 
fundamental 
axiomatic 
assumption 
(element 1) 
All the characteristics of the sub-spaces of the 
geographical complex are measurable or can be 
measured, through the measurable results they can 
produce. 
2nd 
fundamental 
axiomatic 
assumption 
(element 2) 
Within the framework of the geographical area under 
study, there exist more than two consistent and 
homogeneous Poles which are also: i) self-determined 
and in relation to their international environment and ii) 
hetero-determined, uniformly and identically to their 
international environment which is determined by the 
international actors that dwell within them and their 
common systemic relation is their characteristic. 
Auxiliary  
hypotheses of 
the protective 
belt 
1st auxiliary 
hypothesis  
(element 1) 
The size of power is analyzed in four fundamental 
entities (Defence/Security, Economy, Politics and 
Culture/Information), which are analyzed in a number of 
geopolitical indices detected and measured in the 
internal structures of the Poles of power.  
2nd auxiliary 
hypothesis  
(element 2) 
The Poles of power constitute fundamental structural 
components of an international and ever-changing 
unstable System. 
3rd auxiliary 
hypothesis  
(element 3) 
The Poles of power express social volitions or volitions of 
the deciding factors that characterize the international 
attitude of each one of them. Therefore, these Poles may 
be national states, collective international institutions, 
economic organizations of an international scope or 
combinations of the above which, however, present 
uniformity of action within the international framework 
concerning their systemic function. 
4th auxiliary 
hypothesis  
(element 4) 
The developed “causal” and “causative” notions of the 
Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Spaces, as well as their 
combinations, Complete and Special Composite Spaces. 
5th auxiliary 
hypothesis  
(element 5) 
The International System has a completely unsure, 
unstable and shifting structure. 
6th auxiliary 
hypothesis  
(element 6) 
 
Systemic Geopolitical Analysis aims to conclusions of 
“praxeology”, that is of some “theory of practice”, i.e. to 
the construction of a predictive model of the trends of 
power redistribution and in no case to guidelines for 
action under some polarized perspective. The latter is 
the “geostrategic biased synthesis” which uses the 
results of the geopolitical analysis in a following stage. 
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Contents of the Geopolitical Research Program 
Positive 
heuristics 
1 
The replacement of a set of auxiliary assumptions by 
another set constitutes an intra-program problemshift, 
since only the protective belt and not the hard core is 
altered. Such an intra-program problemshift should be 
made in accordance with the positive heuristics of the 
problem, that is the set of suggestions or advices 
functioning as guidelines for the development of 
particular theories within the program.  
2 
A key concern of the geopolitical research program is to 
describe the suggestions that will determine the content 
of the positive heuristics of the program in question. 
Without them, it is impossible to assess the 
progressivism of the geopolitical analysis according to 
the necessary “novel empirical content” expected in the 
analytical model. 
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Table 5: Basic terminology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis (Mazis, 2002) (Mazis, 2012) 
(Domatioti, 2017b, pp. 153-154). 
 
Term  Interpretation 
Geopolitical 
Factor 
It is the factor that causes the redistribution of power in the 
geopolitical system/complex under study. It affects specific 
geopolitical indicators of each geopolitical pillar. The geopolitical 
pillars and their respective geopolitical indicators are selected by 
the analyst and his or her interdisciplinary research team 
according to their gravity/importance criterion. 
Geographical 
Space 
Geography is “the science that describes and analyzes the natural 
space and the dialectical compositions of this space with the 
human societies, which constitute the human spaces. The 
productions of these dialectical processes are defined as primary, 
secondary and tertiary geographical spaces”.  
Geopolitical 
System 
It is the exact sum of the territorial units that make up the 
geopolitical subsystems identified by the location, distinct action 
and systematic and distinct functioning of the particular 
geopolitical agent in their natural space. 
Geopolitical 
Complex 
It is the broader geographic unit of the geopolitical system. 
Geopolitical 
Super-system 
It represents the Poles of International Power that influence the 
action of geopolitical factors within the subsystems, as well as 
inside the respective system that includes them. 
Geopolitical  
Subsystem 
It is the homogeneous, in terms of the action and function of a 
geopolitical factor, territorial unity.  
Geopolitical Index 
It refers to the quantification of the subject under study, the 
numeric element that represents the redistribution of power in 
the geopolitical system/complex. It is defined as: Geopolitical 
Index GIt= d(t)/D, where d(t) is the measured size at time t and D 
a definition level of each geopolitical index d(t). Geopolitical 
indices may be complex or simple. 
Weighted 
Geopolitical Index 
The percentage of weight/significance of a geopolitical index. It is 
a simple statistical weighted index, which refers to a specific 
geopolitical index. 
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Term Interpretation 
Geopolitical Pillars 
of Power 
Geopolitics studies four aspects of exercise of influence by nation-
state entities or other forms of international actors (new poles of 
international power). These are: defensive, economic, political 
and cultural. Consequently, the power pylons are the four pillars 
(Defense/Security, Economy, Politics, Culture/Information) that 
determine power and its distribution in the complex under study. 
The Pillars of Power are broken down in simple and complex 
geopolitical indices. Complex indices are the outcome of the 
algorithmic synthesis of simple indices, according to the estimates 
of the researcher or the research team.  
Geographical 
Time 
It is the leaping calendar time that characterizes a dialectic 
process (dialectisher prozess) defined by the corresponding 
partial dialectical changes, regarding the three following 
characteristics: i) social forces, ii) the corresponding productive 
relations and iii) the corresponding structures of the economic 
spaces in each phase of this dialectic process. Geographical time 
is not measured by the “sunrise and sunset”, but by the socio-
economic changes taking place in a particular geographic area. It 
emphasizes the spatial dimension of time, but the measurement 
unit is the complete/integrated socio-economic changes, as they 
take place in the context of historical time.  
Conversion of 
Geographical 
Time 
It is the conversion of duration, rate and density of the 
geographical time, which is defined by the number of integrated 
individual quantitative dialectical compositions per unit of time 
and by the number of integrated qualitative social changes that 
set qualitative social benchmarks, in the transition of society 
towards higher forms of social organization per unit of time.  
Rate of 
Geographical 
Time 
It represents the number of integrated individual quantitative 
dialectical compositions per unit of time. 
Density of 
Geographical 
Time 
It represents the number of integrated qualitative social changes 
that set qualitative social benchmarks, in the transition of society 
towards higher forms of social organization per unit of time. 
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Table 6: Steps of the Researcher/Research Program of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis 
(Domatioti, 2017a, p. 33). 
 
Steps of the 
Researcher/ 
Research Institute 
Interpretation of Steps 
1 
Location of the geographical complex on the map, after careful 
reading of the research title. Recognition of the geopolitical factor 
in the title of the research and division of the area in question into 
subsystems and supra-system, based on the geopolitical factor of 
the research. Summing up of the subsystems and setting-up of the 
geopolitical system’s boundaries. 
2 
Definition/selection of the geopolitical pillars of power, according 
to which the researcher or the research institute shall analyze the 
action and operation of the geopolitical factor, regarding the 
redistribution of power. The four geopolitical pillars of power are: 
a) Defense/Security, b) Politics, c) Economy and d) 
Culture/Information.  
3 
Selection of simple or complex geopolitical indicators, based on the 
chosen geopolitical pillars of power (i.e. concerning the 
Defense/Security geopolitical pillar of power, some simple 
geopolitical indicators could be, for instance, military spending in 
US dollars or the number of military bases; an example of 
compound geopolitical indicator could be the projection of defence 
force in a geographical complex). The researcher/research institute 
should put limitations in the research and choose accordingly those 
geopolitical indicators that he or she deems essential. 
4 
After the selection of geopolitical indicators (measurable data) a 
simple, comparative presentation or use of simple and complex 
quantitative tools in data processing is easily made. If the 
researcher is familiar with mathematics and informatics, he or she 
may use the first three sections of the following geo-informatics 
fields. The fields of geo-informatics are: a) Neural Networks, b) 
Fuzzy Logic, c) Artificial Intelligence Transmitters, d) Genetic 
Algorithms and e) Cellular Automation.  
5 
After data processing, as described in step 4, the geopolitical model 
of redistribution of power is created from the results of Systemic 
Geopolitical Analysis. At this point the geopolitical analysis is 
concluded. The geopolitical model of redistribution of power is the 
pure outcome of data processing. Afterwards, a different approach 
of the geopolitical model involving a specific point of view may take 
place. This is the geostrategic synthesis, which should not be 
confused with Systemic Geopolitical Analysis and the production of 
the geopolitical model of redistribution of power.  
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2.2. The geopolitical complex of the South-Eastern Mediterranean 
The newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the South-Eastern Mediterranean 
tend to transform the security architecture of the region and cause a redistribution of 
power among regional and international key players. This evolving new balance of 
power affects the status quo of a critical area within the Rimland, according to the 
theory of N.J. Spykman (2004). This research investigates the redistribution of power in 
the region, as a result of the construction and operation of the EastMed pipeline, and 
the hypothesis of Greece’s geopolitical upgrade. 
Therefore, the following research questions to be addressed by this dissertation 
emerge:  
1. How does the construction of the EastMed pipeline affect the geopolitical 
potential of Greece in the South-Eastern Mediterranean? 
2. What is the geopolitical effect of the Greek-Cypriot-Israeli-Egyptian alliance? 
3. What is the impact of the EastMed pipeline on Greek foreign policy regarding 
Cyprus? 
This dissertation will contribute to the critical approach and quantification of this 
impact in regional geopolitical balance, focusing especially on Greece’s role. This shall 
be accomplished by “producing the Resultant Power Trend of the given geopolitical 
factor on Subsystem and System level” (Mazis & Daras, 2017d). 
Following the abovementioned steps of the geopolitical research program, we 
define the fundamental features of this study. According to the title of the subject, the 
geopolitical factor that influences the redistribution of power is the EastMed pipeline. 
The geopolitical complex under study is the South-Eastern Mediterranean and as 
geopolitical system the researcher defines the system that includes the states of 
Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt and Italy and is located in the internal space of the 
Complex, as directly influenced by the geopolitical factor in terms of power. The 
geopolitical factor also affects the distribution of power outside of the system, within 
the wider boundaries of the geopolitical complex; states influenced by the EastMed 
while its route is off their territorial boundaries are Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania. 
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 These states, whether geographical parts of the South-Eastern Mediterranean 
complex or of the external space of the complex, are influenced indirectly by the 
geopolitical factor. For instance, Syria and Lebanon could be able to proceed more 
easily to offshore hydrocarbon exploration in a stable environment, built on energy 
cooperation with an established corridor for exports to the European markets; Jordan 
could expand its cooperation with Cyprus and increase its security of supply via gas 
imports, if the Aphrodite field proved to be commercially exploitable, something that 
would be ensured if the EastMed was to be implemented; finally, Libya would have a 
lot to gain from the emerging stability, trying to establish its authority in the interior 
and recover control over its resources, while having the ability to increase its gas 
exports to Europe via the new energy corridor.  
On the other hand, states of the Balkans, i.e., Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia, could 
either benefit in terms of security of supply and diversification of suppliers or 
economically by becoming transit countries. It must be noted that there have been 
recent media reports about concerns arising among participants in the project (e.g. US 
and Israel) due to Italy’s position toward the pipeline’s construction and the possibility 
of an alternative route via Serbia (Energy Press, 2018). Prospects for energy 
collaboration and participation in the EastMed’s transit network have grown for 
Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania, as confirmed by the recent Craiova Forum Summit and 
IGI Poseidon’s project plans.  
Turkey is also situated in the geographical area under study, but the effect of the 
geopolitical factor excludes it from the examined system. Turkey’s influence over the 
geopolitical factor is minor to zero since it does not possess any of the natural 
resources involved or participate in any political, military or energy cooperation 
related to the project; moreover, Turkey is excluded from the transit route and isn’t 
linked to the project in terms of export and energy security. Finally, Italy is not situated 
geographically within the complex, but the action of the geopolitical factor renders it 
part of the geopolitical system. 
The geopolitical subsystems under study are a) Greece-Cyprus-Israel (the dipole of 
Hellenism alongside Israel), b) Israel-Egypt-Greece-Cyprus (the tripartite alliances) and 
c) Greece-Cyprus-Italy (the ‘European South’ component within the system). At the 
Super-system level, the agents that influence, whether negatively or positively, the 
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geopolitical factor and the redistribution of power are Turkey, the EU, the US and 
Russia; moreover, Israel, which is a component of the system, plays a critical role in the 
regional security architecture, acting also as a super-systemic agent.  
The Geopolitical Pillars of Power, in the context of which the action of the 
geopolitical factor is examined, are the Defence/Security and Politics pillars. The first 
one is selected because of the strong military alliances and cooperation forged among 
the states that shall be enhanced by the action of the geopolitical factor (protection of 
exploitation of resources, infrastructure and energy routes), resulting in a restructured 
balance of military and energy security in the area. The agents’ projection of power 
shall affect this pillar. Moreover, the pillar of Politics is of grave importance and chosen 
to be studied, because of the fact that political decisions made (e.g. assigning warships 
to escort and protect drill ships or signing joint infrastructure agreements) are crucial 
for the region’s exploitation of resources and infrastructure protection, as well as for 
the political alliances shaped by bilateral agreements among the participant states, 
which tend to shift their foreign policy agendas and transform regional security 
architecture. Additionally, energy security and exports are factors related directly to 
political stability, influence and power. The first pillar is analysed in the Complex 
Geopolitical Index of Projection of Defence Power and the second in the Complex 
Geopolitical Index of Political Influence and Stability.  
These indices will produce the geopolitical model describing the redistribution of 
power in the internal space of the geopolitical system. The model’s validity will depend 
on the critical approach of the data, the validity of its sources and on the researcher’s 
commitment during the process of analysis (Domatioti, 2017b, pp. 155-157). The 
pipeline’s operation spatial impact shall be studied on the Primary Physical, Secondary 
Political and Tertiary National-State spaces (Table 7). The stages of the research are 
the following: 
1. Literature review on the dissertation’s subject matter. The review’s findings in 
international literature about the exploitation of the South-Eastern 
Mediterranean gas deposits, especially via the construction of the EastMed 
pipeline, as well as the relevant geopolitical implications are presented in a 
separate chapter. This study is conducted from the N.J. Spykman’s Rimland 
theory perspective.  
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2. Methodological and epistemological overview of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis. 
3. Definition of the Geopolitical Complex, System, Subsystems, Super-system and 
Pillars of Power, in relation to the designated geopolitical factor. 
4. Computation of the Complex Geopolitical Index ‘Projection of Defence Power’, 
data collection and processing to estimate the Power Performance of 
Subsystems 1,2 and 3 in the Defence/Security Pillar. It comprises the 
geopolitical indicators: ‘Naval Power’; ‘Air Force Power’; ‘Joint Military 
Exercises’. 
5. Computation of the Complex Geopolitical Index ‘Political Influence and 
Stability’, data collection and processing to estimate the Power Performance of 
Subsystems 1,2 and 3 in the Politics Pillar. It comprises the geopolitical 
indicators: ‘Security of Gas Supply’; ‘Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements’; 
‘Gas exports’.  
6. Computation of the Subsystems’ Total Power Performance. 
7. Production of the Geopolitical Model of redistribution of power, which 
describes the balance or imbalance of power within the geopolitical system. 
8. Verification of the hypothesis of Greece’s geopolitical upgrade, as a result of 
the EastMed’s operation. 
9. Geostrategic Synthesis. 
For the quantification of the selected geopolitical indicators in each subsystem 
and pillar of power an algorithm is created; the methods of the weighted arithmetic 
mean and the arithmetic mean are applied. During the analysis, weighting factors will 
be assigned to each simple and complex indicator of the pillars in the interval [0,1]. 
The researcher shall compute the power performance of each pillar and consequently 
the total power performance of the subsystems. The respective power performance 
graphs for each subsystem will be created and compared.  
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Table 7: Types of Geographical Spaces (Mazis, 2012). 
Types of Geographical Spaces 
Primary 
Geographical 
Spaces 
 
Natural Space: Space that is primary on a dialectic level, therefore a 
‘causal’ and ‘sub-structural’ space. It is perceived as the sum of geophysical 
elements, such as: vegetation; animals; territorial relief; underground 
resources; natural resources etc.  
 
Elementary Human Space: Space that is primary on a dialectic level, 
therefore a ‘causal’ and ‘sub-structural’ space. It is perceived as the sum of 
human-related elements, such as: tribes, population gatherings and 
demographic composition based on sex, age, etc.; it does not include 
national and ethnic units, which are products of by definition secondary 
economic, cultural and political procedures. 
Secondary 
Geographical 
Spaces 
 
Political Space: Space that is secondary on a dialectic level, therefore a 
‘super-structural’ space. It is a product of the interactions between the 
reproduction, conservation and evolution of the systems of material or 
immaterial (i.e. ideological) production in the interior of a given society.  
 
 
Economic Space: Space that is secondary on a dialectic level, therefore a 
‘super-structural’ space. In the context of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis, it 
is not identical with the Marxist dipole ‘Substructure-Superstructure’. 
 
Tertiary 
Geographical 
Spaces 
Cultural space: It is a product of the interaction and dialectic synthesis 
between Economic Space and Political Space. In this sense Cultural Space is 
tertiary on a dialectic level, therefore a ‘super-structural’ space. Culture is 
defined as the resultant of human intellectual function and interventions in 
the international geophysical, social and cultural environment.  
National-state Space or Nation-state Space: It is a Cultural Space, therefore 
tertiary on a dialectic level and a ‘super-structural’ space. The variation 
between the terms of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationality’ is underlined. 
Composite Spaces: 
a) Complete Composite Spaces: They are defined as the sum of the 
primary, secondary and tertiary characteristics of Space. 
b) Special Composite Spaces or Spatial Grids: They are defined as the 
individual combinations of overlapping between the dialectic 
synthesis of the dipole Natural Space-Human Space on the one hand 
and of the sub-divisions of Secondary and Tertiary Spaces on the other 
hand. 
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2.3. Research limitations 
In this research, the following limitations are set: 
1. The impact of the geopolitical factor under study focuses on the geopolitical 
system that includes Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt and Italy. However, the 
geopolitical factor shall have an impact on more states, as described in 
subsection 2.2. In this respect, further research should be done to cover every 
aspect of the EastMed’s impact in terms of power. 
2. The pillars studied in this dissertation are Defence/Security and Politics. The 
pillars of Economy and Culture/Information are also critical and should be 
addressed thoroughly. 
3. The geographical spaces studied are the Primary Physical, Secondary Political 
and Tertiary National-State spaces. 
4. This study is conducted exclusively within the boundaries of the system – 
subsystems  –  super-system as described in subsection 2.2.  
5. This research focuses exclusively on the impact of the EastMed’s operation on 
the redistribution of power in the defined geopolitical system and only in terms 
of the two complex geopolitical indices referred to in subsection 2.2.  
6. The data used for the purposes of this study is collected exclusively from open 
sources such as official governmental agencies and ministries, research and 
analysis institutes, scientific journals or publications and valid news outlets.  
7. This research has encountered specific adversities during data collection. 
Information concerning NG supply distribution per state and volumes available 
for export or joint military exercises and specifics of agreements was not 
always available. In some cases, some of this information was not available at 
governmental or other valid sources at all; thus, it is possible that relevant 
information is not considered hereby, having an effect on the overall 
quantification of indicators. Data included in this dissertation was selected 
when verification of correlation with the geopolitical factor’s action could be 
established by valid sources, or when it was assumed that its inclusion could 
affect this action (e.g. in the case of military exercises, a higher level of efficient 
coordination between military forces enhances, in any case, their ability to 
respond to any relevant threats).     
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3. Systemic Geopolitical Analysis 
In the following section the study of the defined geopolitical system is presented, 
according to the methodology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis. 
3.1. Basic Assumptions 
To proceed to the quantitative analysis of redistribution of power in the defined 
geopolitical system, the researcher makes some basic assumptions: 
1. According to official statements, the participant parties to the project intend to 
reach a final agreement about the EastMed and sign an IGA in 2019, with the 
prospect of proceeding to its prompt construction. Considering the 5 to 6 years 
duration for the development of the project (estimated completion date – 
2025), possible delays and the geopolitical, technical and economical obstacles 
arising from the nature of the project, as described in chapter 1, the time 
horizon set for this research is the year 2030. 
2. The geopolitical factor, as a critical joint energy project for the Greece-Cyprus-
Israel alliance, affects the redistribution of power in the system; its influence is 
expressed by the geopolitical characteristics of the indicators selected and 
which are related to the geopolitical factor. 
3. To formulate the geopolitical indicators, it is considered that in each subsystem 
the values described shall be taken into account, not only when all the parties 
comprising the subsystem are included but also when at least two states are 
involved out of the sum, in each characteristic they embody (e.g. joint military 
exercises conducted by 2 out of 4 participant states).  
4. The data considered in this research for the quantification of the ‘Joint Military 
Exercises’ and ‘Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements’ indicators covers the 
period 2010-2018, since the rapprochement among the states of Israel, Greece 
and Cyprus has begun. 
5. For the quantification of the ‘Naval Power’ and ‘Air Force Power’ indicators, the 
data used refers to the year 2018. These indicators reflect the deterring 
capability of states and subsystems, to avert possible infrastructure security 
threats or counterbalance the Turkish or any other external projection of 
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power, in its attempt to be involved in future energy developments in the 
region. According to the information about military expenditure by country for 
the period 2009-2017, there is a relative stability of the states’ defence budgets 
and the arms procurement equilibrium is stable; therefore, balance of power as 
a corollary of the geopolitical factor’s effect is assumed to be preserved 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2018).    
6. The joint military exercises (2010-2018) conducted also represent the deterring 
capability of states and subsystems. The high level of interoperability necessary 
to achieve the aforementioned goals is enhanced by various kinds of exercises; 
search and rescue, defence of offshore gas installations, protection against oil 
spill accidents and ground, air and maritime combat capacity upgrade joint 
drills are considered in this research. Multinational exercises with the 
participation of states out of the scope of the system are also included, 
whereas strictly NATO oriented exercises of irrelevant scope have been 
excluded. Additionally, the established military cooperation among the actors is 
now based on annual bilateral agreements of cooperation and joint drills are 
conducted mostly on a yearly or biennial basis; therefore, it is assumed that the 
current balance of power is preserved. 
7. The analysis of each subsystem’s Naval Power considers 5 different types of 
battleships, based on their role and different level of firepower. These are 
aircraft carriers; frigates; destroyers; corvettes; and submarines. Accordingly, 
the analysis of each subsystem’s Air Force Power considers 3 different types of 
attacking aircrafts, based on their role and different level of firepower. These 
are fighters; attack aircrafts; and attack helicopters. 
8. Security of supply is considered in terms of NG supply. Energy security is a 
crucial political objective for states; security of gas supply and diversification of 
sources are, consequently, a measure of political power. The announced initial 
carrying capacity of the EastMed pipeline is 10 bcm/y; other scenarios of the 
conducted studies propose that this capacity could rise up to 16 or to 20 bcm/y 
(C&M Engineering S.A., n.d.) (Stambolis & Sofianos, 2012). For the purposes of 
this paper, the researcher has selected the capacity of 10 bcm/y to examine the 
baseline scenario, in which only Cypriot (Aphrodite and Calypso fields) and 
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Israeli (Leviathan and Tamar fields) resources are gas suppliers to the project; 
moreover, it is assumed that this capacity is equally distributed between the 
Greek and Italian gas networks (5 bcm/y), either to cover domestic needs or to 
be exported to Western or South-Eastern Europe, via the Poseidon and IGB 
outlets. An additional capacity of 1 bcm/y is designated to feed future 
consumption in Cyprus, as preliminary planning predicts.  
9. The bilateral and multilateral agreements (2010-2018) concluded among states 
express their committed political cooperation. Agreements included herein are 
those related to the geopolitical factor, in terms of energy cooperation and 
energy security, EEZ delimitation and maritime demarcation, technology, 
exchange of information, research and innovation, as well as the MoU signed 
about the construction of the EastMed pipeline and the strategic partnership 
on energy MoU between the EU and Egypt. MoUs, even if it is unspecified 
whether they embody legally binding terms, are considered to express the 
parties’ willingness to solidify their collaboration. Regarding Subsystem 3, the 
European energy legislation is incorporated in the analysis.  
10. Gas exports constitute a factor that signifies political influence over the 
importers, if handled accordingly; therefore, exporters with abundance of 
resources and export capacity are able to promote their national interests 
efficiently and achieve independence and economic growth. Due to existing 
regulations in Israel, since June 2013, gas exports from reserves greater than 
200 bcm are allowed up to the level of 50% (Delek Group, 2018). Consequently, 
the total gas quantity available for exports is 360 bcm. Israel will have the 
ability to act as a regional exporter for the period 2020-2040, based on current 
discoveries (Akyener, 2016). Therefore, apart from already concluded contracts 
with Egypt (64 bcm) and Jordan (59 bcm), it shall be able to export around 9.87 
bcm/y outside its region (Delek Group, 2018) (Financial Times, 2018) (Globes, 
Israel Business News, 2018). As ENTSOG’s Arturo de Onís also underlines, Israel 
and its 9 bcma surplus could be an alternative supplier for Europe until 2040 
(De Onís, 2017). The researcher assumes that this Israeli capacity shall feed the 
EastMed pipeline, while the other 1 bcm to be exported will come from the 
Aphrodite field, in accordance with Cyprus’s projected export capacity, as a 
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report by Taliotis has shown (Taliotis, et al., 2015, p. 3). The 1 bcm of gas 
intended for Cyprus’s needs is assumed to be covered by its sources and, 
therefore, it is not considered as an export. 
11. The cooperation between Egypt and Israel is not yet so advanced, due to their 
historical conflict, but their relations tend to ameliorate gradually after the 
energy developments of the past decade. They mostly collaborate on local 
security and recently on energy issues. Hence, their bilateral cooperation in 
terms of the present study is limited and not considered herein. In this study, 
Egypt is not considered to be neither a participant in the project nor an 
exporter via the EastMed pipeline.  
3.2. Algorithm Implementation 
In this chapter the quantification of the indicators and the implementation of the 
algorithm applied, in order to compute the power performance of the subsystems in 
the defined system, will be presented. 
3.2.1. Pillar of Defence/Security 
After extensively reviewing all available sources, the data required for the study of 
the Pillar of Defence/Security is presented in tables and the implementation of the 
algorithm for every geopolitical indicator follows. 
 
Naval Power 
The data for the battleships considered in this study is retrieved from the Global 
Firepower website, for almost all the states comprising the subsystems. Data for 
Cyprus’s Armed Forces is retrieved from the Armed Forces UK website (Global 
Firepower, 2019a) (Armed Forces UK, Defence Suppliers Directory, n.d.). This data is 
presented by state and by subsystem in Tables 8 and 9. 
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Table 8: Naval Power by type of Battleship and State (Global Firepower, 2019b) (Armed Forces 
UK, Defence Suppliers Directory, n.d.).  
 
Naval Power 
States 
Aircraft 
Carriers 
Frigates Destroyers Corvettes Submarines 
Greece 0 13 0 0 11 
Israel 0 0 0 3 6 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt 2 9 0 4 6 
Italy 2 14 4 2 8 
 
Table 9: Naval Power by type of Battleship and Subsystem (Global Firepower, 2019b) (Armed 
Forces UK, Defence Suppliers Directory, n.d.). 
  
Naval Power 
Subsystems 
Aircraft 
Carriers 
Frigates Destroyers Corvettes Submarines 
Subsystem 1 0 13 0 3 17 
Subsystem 2 2 22 0 7 23 
Subsystem 3 2 27 4 2 19 
 
According to its type, size, role and significance for the field of operations under 
study, the researcher assigns a rate to each combatant ship, in order to describe its 
influence on the formation of naval power performance. The rating scale is defined as 
follows: 0-15%, low; 16-30%, medium; 31-45%, good; 46-60%, high; 61-75%, excellent; 
76-90%, remarkable. Ratings over 90% are considered nonfactual and not assigned, 
due to the unavoidable disadvantages of any vessel. Aircraft carriers are assigned a 
rate of 90%, frigates a rate of 40%, destroyers a rate of 70%, corvettes a rate of 20% 
and submarines a rate of 80%.  
Aircraft carriers are rated higher than the other ships because of their potential to 
be used as seaborne airfields and support surface, subsurface and airborne operations 
even to distant locations. They are the leading ships of a naval fleet, allowing a 
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National-State actor to project air power superiority. The three surface combatant 
ships, frigates, destroyers and corvettes are rated according to their warship class and 
capabilities. Destroyers are suitable for war, escort and non-combat operations, while 
having high firepower and endurance. Frigates are heavier ships than corvettes, with 
which they share various resemblances, and their role is mostly protective of other 
ships. They present anti-submarine capabilities and higher endurance than corvettes. 
Corvettes are smaller in size than frigates but possess higher manoeuvrability and are 
more efficient tactically in smaller seas. Finally, submarines are an invaluable asset for 
promoting and securing national interests, since they possess heavy firepower, high 
endurance and stealth capabilities that enable them to participate in various types of 
operations, such as covert missions, intelligence, monitoring, special operations etc.  
In order to evaluate the power performance of subsystems, the researcher applies 
the weighted mean formula: 
 
                                                (1)                  
 
 
 
where wi refers to the rate assigned, i.e., the weight of each type of ship, and xi is the 
value of the indicator. 
 
Subsystem 1: μ1 =  =  =   = 6.47 
 
Subsystem 2: μ2 =  =  =   = 10.13 
 
Subsystem 3: μ3 =  =  =  = 10.33 
 
The results are presented in Table 10. 
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Table 10: Naval Power by Subsystem. 
Naval Power 
Subsystem 1 6.47 
Subsystem 2 10.13 
Subsystem 3 10.33 
 
To be able to compare data of different types of information or value, the 
researcher converts them into a comparable form. Therefore, the results are 
normalized into the interval [0,1] by applying the following formula: 
 
 =                                                          (2) 
 
where i = 1,….m; j = 1,…. n; xj’ = max {xij} 
 
For x’=10.33, the data for Naval Power is transformed as follows: 
 
Subsystem 1: ρ1 =  = 0.63 
Subsystem 2: ρ2 =  = 0.98 
Subsystem 3: ρ3 =  = 1 
 
The normalized data is presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Normalized data for Naval Power. 
Naval Power 
Subsystem 1 0.63 
Subsystem 2 0.98 
Subsystem 3 1 
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Air Force Power 
The data for the aircrafts considered in this study is retrieved from the Global 
Firepower website, for almost all the states comprising the subsystems. Data for 
Cyprus’s Armed Forces is retrieved from the Armed Forces UK website (Global 
Firepower, 2019c) (Armed Forces UK, Defence Suppliers Directory, n.d.). This data is 
presented by state and by subsystem in Tables 12 and 13.  
 
Table 12: Air Force Power by type of Aircraft and State (Global Firepower, 2019c) (Armed 
Forces UK, Defence Suppliers Directory, n.d.).  
 
Air Force Power 
States Fighters Attack Aircrafts Attack Helicopters 
Greece 189 0 29 
Israel 252 0 48 
Cyprus 0 0 11 
Egypt 309 100 10 
Italy 90 96 59 
 
Table 13: Air Force Power by type of Aircraft and Subsystem (Global Firepower, 2019c) (Armed 
Forces UK, Defence Suppliers Directory, n.d.). 
  
Air Force Power 
Subsystems Fighters Attack Aircrafts Attack Helicopters 
Subsystem 1 441 0 88 
Subsystem 2 750 100 98 
Subsystem 3 279 96 99 
 
According to its type, size, role and significance for the field of operations under 
study, the researcher assigns a rate to each aircraft, in order to describe its influence 
on air force power performance. Fighters are assigned a rate of 80%, attack aircrafts a 
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rate of 70% and attack helicopters a rate of 60%. Fighters are assigned a higher rate, 
due to their multirole capability (air and ground strikes) and importance of their 
operations during the ongoing “war” for air superiority over the Aegean; attack 
aircrafts are also highly rated because of their ability to strike with great firepower 
ground and naval targets and provide close-air support troops on the ground, by 
destroying heavily armoured enemy forces and neutralizing radars and enemy anti-air 
batteries; helicopters are valued significantly as well, because of their efficiency and 
flexibility on tactical level and the logistical advantages they provide, such as their 
lower procurement and maintenance costs.  
By applying formula (1), the contribution of aircrafts to each subsystem’s power 
performance is evaluated as follows: 
 
Subsystem 1: μ1 =  =  =   = 193.14 
 
Subsystem 2: μ2 =  =  =   = 347.05 
 
Subsystem 3: μ3 =  =  =  = 166.6 
 
The results are presented in Table 14. 
 
Table 14: Air Force Power by Subsystem. 
Air Force Power 
Subsystem 1 193.14 
Subsystem 2 347.05 
Subsystem 3 166.6 
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The results are normalized as above for x’=347.05, by applying formula (2):  
 
Subsystem 1: ρ1 =  = 0.56 
Subsystem 2: ρ2 =  = 1 
Subsystem 3: ρ3 =  = 0.48 
 
The normalized data is presented in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Normalized data for Air Force Power. 
Air Force Power 
Subsystem 1 0.56 
Subsystem 2 1 
Subsystem 3 0.48 
 
Joint Military Exercises 
The necessary information to quantify this indicator was collected from the 
websites of the Ministries of Defence of the states under study and from the “Turkey, 
Israel, Greece: Reshuffling in the Eastern Mediterranean” publication by Mazis (2018, 
pp. 38-47). The joint military exercises conducted with the participation of the 
system’s states are presented by subsystem in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Joint Military Exercises by Subsystem. 
Joint Military Exercises 
Subsystem 1 53 
Subsystem 2 60 
Subsystem 3 19 
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The results are normalized as above, by setting x’=60 and applying formula (2):  
 
Subsystem 1: ρ1 =  = 0.88 
Subsystem 2: ρ2 =  = 1 
Subsystem 3: ρ3 =  = 0.32 
 
The normalized values are presented in Table 17.  
 
Table 17: Normalized data for Joint Military Exercises. 
Joint Military Exercises 
Subsystem 1 0.88 
Subsystem 2 1 
Subsystem 3 0.32 
 
3.2.2. Pillar of Politics 
After extensively reviewing all available sources, the data required for the study of 
the Pillar of Politics is presented in tables and the implementation of the algorithm for 
every geopolitical indicator follows. 
 
Security of Gas Supply 
The selection of Natural Gas volumes has been explicated in subchapter 3.1. The 
necessary information was retrieved and checked by various sources (IGI Podeidon, 
2015) (C&M Engineering S.A., n.d.) (Stambolis & Sofianos, 2012). The respective 
capacity, therefore, to contribute to the importers’ security of gas supply in the 
system, is presented in Table 18.  
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Table 18: Supply of Natural Gas by State. 
States 
Security of Gas Supply 
(bcm/y) 
Greece 5 
Israel 0 
Cyprus 1 
Egypt 0 
Italy 5 
 
The figures of the gas supply are aggregated at Subsystem level (Table 19). 
 
Table 19: Supply of Natural Gas by Subsystem. 
Security of Gas Supply (bcm/y) 
Subsystem 1 6 
Subsystem 2 6 
Subsystem 3 11 
 
The results are normalized by setting x’=11 and applying formula (2): 
 
Subsystem 1: ρ1 =  = 0.54 
Subsystem 2: ρ2 =  = 0.54 
Subsystem 3: ρ3 =  = 1 
 
The normalized values are presented in Table 20. 
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Table 20: Normalized data for Security of Gas Supply. 
Security of Gas Supply  
Subsystem 1 0.54 
Subsystem 2 0.54 
Subsystem 3 1 
 
Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
Information collected from official sources such as the websites of the Ministries 
of Energy, Foreign Affairs or other relevant state authorities and from the “Turkey, 
Israel, Greece: Reshuffling in the Eastern Mediterranean” publication by Mazis, was 
used for the quantification of this indicator (Mazis, 2018, pp. 38-47). The bilateral and 
multilateral agreements in force among the states of the geopolitical system are 
presented in Table 21.  
 
Table 21: Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements by 
Subsystem. 
 
Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
Subsystem 1 11 
Subsystem 2 15 
Subsystem 3 12 
 
These figures are normalized by setting x’=15 and applying formula (2): 
 
Subsystem 1: ρ1 =  = 0.73 
Subsystem 2: ρ2 =  = 1 
Subsystem 3: ρ3 =  = 0.8 
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The normalized data is presented in Table 22. 
 
Table 22: Normalized data for Bilateral and 
Multilateral Agreements. 
 
Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
Subsystem 1 0.73 
Subsystem 2 1 
Subsystem 3 0.8 
 
Gas Exports 
The data for the quantification of Natural Gas exports was retrieved by various 
sources, in order to define the annual volume of gas to be exported (Delek Group, 
2018) (Akyener, 2016) (Financial Times, 2018) (Globes, Israel Business News, 2018) 
(Taliotis, et al., 2015, p. 3). Gas exports by state, via the EastMed pipeline, are 
presented in Table 23.  
 
Table 23: Natural Gas Exports by State. 
States Gas Exports (bcm/y) 
Greece 0 
Israel 9 
Cyprus 1 
Egypt 0 
Italy 0 
 
Gas Exports are aggregated at Subsystem level in Table 24. 
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Table 24: Gas Exports by Subsystem. 
Gas Exports (bcm/y) 
Subsystem 1 10 
Subsystem 2 10 
Subsystem 3 1 
 
These figures are normalized by setting x’=10 and applying formula (2): 
 
Subsystem 1: ρ1 =  = 1 
Subsystem 2: ρ2 =  = 1 
Subsystem 3: ρ3 =  = 0.1 
 
The normalized data is presented in Table 25. 
 
Table 25: Normalized data for Gas Exports. 
Gas Exports  
Subsystem 1 1 
Subsystem 2 1 
Subsystem 3 0.1 
 
3.2.3. Total Power Performance  
The quantified and normalized values of the above geopolitical indicators for each 
subsystem are summarized in Table 26.  
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Table 26: Normalized Geopolitical Indicators by Subsystem. 
Geopolitical 
Indicators 
Pillar of Defence/Security Pillar of Politics 
Naval 
Power 
Air  
Force 
Power 
Joint 
Military 
Exercises 
Security 
of Gas 
Supply  
Bilateral and 
Multilateral 
Agreements 
Gas 
Exports  
Subsystem 1 0.63 0.56 0.88 0.54 0.73 1 
Subsystem 2 0.98 1 1 0.54 1 1 
Subsystem 3 1 0.48 0.32 1 0.8 0.1 
 
The researcher assumes that the geopolitical indicators do not have equal 
influence on each Pillar’s Power Performance and, thus, weighting factors are assigned 
to them according to their effect.  
In the Defence/Security Pillar, the indicators Naval Power and Air Force Power are 
considered to contribute to power performance with a percentage up to 30% (0,3) 
each and the indicator Joint Military Exercises up to 40% (0,4). Military exercises are 
attributed a higher weight because it is assumed that regular mutual training among 
multinational armed forces acts as a multiplier of power, increasing their level of 
coordination and operational efficiency.  
In the Politics Pillar, Security of Gas Supply and Gas Exports indicators contribute 
to power performance with a percentage up to 30% (0,3) each, while the indicator 
Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements up to 40% (0,4). This higher weight is assigned 
due to the fact that the binding nature of such agreements increases the impact of the 
other indicators’ characteristics and solidifies political partnerships.  
Respectively, it is considered that the Defence/Security and Politics Pillars do not 
contribute equally to the Total Power Performance of Subsystems; thus, a weighting 
factor is attributed to each Pillar, in order to estimate the overall performance of each 
Subsystem. The researcher deems the influence of the Defence/Security Pillar to be up 
to 60% (0,6) and that of the Politics Pillar to be 40% (0,4). It is noted that the sum of all 
weighting factors in each case is equal to one (1).   
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Subsystem 1 
All the necessary data to estimate the Power Performance of Subsystem 1 is 
summarized in Table 27.  
 
Table 27: Pillars of Power for Subsystem 1.   
Geopolitical 
Indicators 
Pillar of Defence/Security Pillar of Politics 
Naval 
Power 
Air 
Force 
Power 
Joint 
Military 
Exercises 
Security 
of Gas 
Supply  
Bilateral and 
Multilateral 
Agreements 
Gas 
Exports 
Subsystem 1 0.63 0.56 0.88 0.54 0.73 1 
Weights of 
Indicators 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Weights of 
Pillars 
0.6 0.4 
 
The Performance of Power in the two Pillars and Total Power Performance of 
Subsystem 1 are estimated as follows:  
 
Power Performance in the Pillar of Defence/Security: 
Subsystem 1: 0.63*0.3 + 0.56*0.3 + 0.88*0.4 = 0.19 + 0.17 + 0.35 = 0.71 
 
Power Performance in the Pillar of Politics: 
Subsystem 1: 0.54*0.3 + 0.73*0.4 + 1*0.3 = 0.16 + 0.29 + 0.30 = 0.75 
 
Total Power Performance: 
Subsystem 1: 0.71*0.6 + 0.75*0,4 = 0.43 + 0.30 = 0.73  
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Subsystem 2 
All the necessary data to estimate the Power Performance of Subsystem 2 is 
summarized in Table 28.  
 
Table 28: Pillars of Power for Subsystem 2.   
Geopolitical 
Indicators 
Pillar of Defence/Security Pillar of Politics 
Naval 
Power 
Air 
Force 
Power 
Joint 
Military 
Exercises 
Security 
of Gas 
Supply  
Bilateral and 
Multilateral 
Agreements 
Gas 
Exports 
Subsystem 2 0.98 1 1 0.54 1 1 
Weights of 
Indicators 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Weights of 
Pillars 
0.6 0.4 
 
The Performance of Power in the two Pillars and Total Power Performance of 
Subsystem 2 are estimated as follows:  
 
Power Performance in the Pillar of Defence/Security: 
Subsystem 2: 0.98*0.3 + 1*0.3 + 1*0.4 = 0.29 + 0.3 + 0.4 = 0.99 
 
Power Performance in the Pillar of Politics: 
Subsystem 2: 0.54*0.3 + 1*0.4 + 1*0.3 = 0.16 + 0.4 + 0.3 = 0.86 
 
Total Power Performance: 
Subsystem 2: 0.99*0.6 + 0.86*0,4 = 0.59 + 0.34 = 0.93 
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Subsystem 3 
All the necessary data to estimate the Power Performance of Subsystem 3 is 
summarized in Table 29.  
 
Table 29: Pillars of Power for Subsystem 3.   
Geopolitical 
Indicators 
Pillar of Defence/Security Pillar of Politics 
Naval 
Power 
Air 
Force 
Power 
Joint 
Military 
Exercises 
Security 
of Gas 
Supply  
Bilateral and 
Multilateral 
Agreements 
Gas 
Exports 
Subsystem 3 1 0.48 0.32 1 0.8 0.1 
Weights of 
Indicators 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Weights of 
Pillars 
0.6 0.4 
  
The Performance of Power in the two Pillars and Total Power Performance of 
Subsystem 3 are estimated as follows:  
 
Power Performance in the Pillar of Defence/Security: 
Subsystem 3: 1*0.3 + 0.48*0.3 + 0.32*0.4 = 0.3 + 0.14 + 0.13 = 0.57 
 
Power Performance in the Pillar of Politics: 
Subsystem 3: 1*0.3 + 0.8*0.4 + 0.1*0.3 = 0.3 + 0.32 + 0.03 = 0.65 
 
Total Power Performance: 
Subsystem 3: 0.57*0.6 + 0.65*0,4 = 0.34 + 0.26 = 0.60 
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System 
The results of the Total Power Performance at Subsystem level are summarized in 
Table 30. 
 
Table 30: Power Performance at Subsystem Level for the Geopolitical System of the South-
Eastern Mediterranean.   
 
Subsystems 
Pillar of 
Defence/Security 
Pillar of Politics Total Power Performance  
Subsystem 1 0.71 0.75 0.73 
Subsystem 2 0.99 0.86 0.93 
Subsystem 3 0.57 0.65 0.60 
  
Finally, the researcher investigates the geopolitical dynamics at systemic level by 
defining the Total Power Performance in two separate scenarios:  
 
a) Participation of Egypt in the EastMed project (P23): 
P23 = 0.93 + 0.60 = 1.53 
 
b) Non-participation of Egypt in the EastMed project (P13): 
P13 = 0.73 + 0.60 = 1.33 
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4. The Geopolitical Model  
The researcher, based on his preliminary assumptions, time frame and the 
described quantification of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis, constructs the geopolitical 
model of redistribution of power in the System of the South-Eastern Mediterranean, 
according to the action of the designated geopolitical factor.  
In the Pillar of Defence/Security, the redistribution of power at Subsystem level is 
depicted in Figure 1. Subsystem 2, comprising Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, 
prevails over the other two subsystems. Subsystem 1, comprising Greece, Cyprus and 
Israel, is inferior to Subsystem 2 but prevails over Subsystem 3, which constitutes the 
European component of the System of the South-Eastern Mediterranean, in terms of 
power. The resulting redistribution of power, as an outcome of the operation of the 
EastMed pipeline, also reflects the high Air Force capability primarily of Israel and 
secondarily of Greece, especially in the light of their recent defence cooperation; 
Egypt’s dominant Air Force capability is a decisive factor for the performance of power 
in Subsystem 2. Italy’s marginal Naval superiority over Egypt is the pivotal element of 
power performance for Subsystem 3. Another crucial factor is the military cooperation, 
in terms of joint military exercises, among Greece, Israel and Cyprus, which forges a 
defence alliance of high potential; Greek and Egyptian defence cooperation is also 
important but to a lesser extent at a joint operational level. 
In the Pillar of Politics, the redistribution of power at Subsystem level is depicted 
in Figure 2. Subsystem 2 prevails over the other two subsystems, while Subsystem 1 
prevails over Subsystem 3, in terms of power. Greece and Italy promote their political 
objectives of security of supply and diversification of energy suppliers and 
transportation routes, via the operation of the EastMed pipeline; consequently, this 
fact enhances the power performance of Subsystem 3, while their EU membership 
along with Cyprus has the same effect in terms of bilateral and multilateral political 
cohesion and power. On the other hand, Israel’s gas export goals are also fostered, 
while closer ties with the EU are established and significant political gains are attained 
as well in this regard. Contribution to the European energy security and diversification 
targets equals a higher level of influence towards the EU. Political cooperation, based 
on various intergovernmental agreements, shapes substantially the conditions for 
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dominance of Subsystem 2, in terms of power performance; this fact is indicative of 
the effect of the tripartite alliances –especially that of Greece-Cyprus-Israel– on the 
redistribution of power, within the spatial boundaries of the System.   
 
 
Figure 1: Power Performance of the Pillar of Defence/Security at Subsystem level. 
 
 
Figure 2: Power Performance of the Pillar of Politics at Subsystem level. 
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The Total Power Performance of Subsystems is depicted in Figure 3. Subsystem 2 
prevails over the other two subsystems, while Subsystem 1 prevails over Subsystem 3, 
in terms of power. Egypt’s contribution to the total performance of Subsystem 2 is 
higher in the Pillar of Defence/Security, in terms of hard power, which is consistent 
with the initial assumption of Egypt’s non-participation in the EastMed project. On the 
contrary, Italy’s most critical contribution to the total performance of Subsystem 3 
relates to soft power and the Pilar of Politics, primarily because of its European and gas 
importer status.  Although Egypt is not a participant in the project, the Subsystem that 
includes it is dominant in the System; therefore, the action of the geopolitical factor – 
according to the quantified redistribution of power described in the model – renders 
the synergy of the tripartite alliances the most influential in terms of power, within the 
boundaries of the Geopolitical System.  
Convergence of interests of the National-State actors of Subsystems 1 and 3 has a 
significant geopolitical impact at systemic level, in view of their EastMed partnership, 
surpassing that of Subsystem 2. However, the synergy of the two tripartite alliances 
(Greece-Israel-Cyprus and Greece-Egypt-Cyprus) with Italy would result in an even 
larger geopolitical effect, in terms of power. Therefore, a possible participation of 
Egypt in the project, even not as a supplier, would result in the highest power 
performance at systemic level. Finally, Greece’s geopolitical potential is expanded, 
reinforced by the scheme of the tripartite alliances, either in terms of defence 
cooperation, via joint training and joint operation capability, sharing of information, 
combat capacity upgrade or in terms of politics, by concluding agreements that render 
Greece a transit state with multiple benefits and by enhancing its security of gas supply 
and diversification of sources.  
In summary, the conclusions reached by analysing the geopolitical model of 
redistribution of power in the System of the South-Eastern Mediterranean, are the 
following: 
1. The ‘European component’ is the least influential in the System, in terms of 
power. 
2. The Greek-Cypriot-Israeli alliance has a strong geopolitical influence within the 
boundaries of the System.  
3. Greece’s geopolitical role is upgraded substantially. 
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4. The dipole of Hellenism constitutes an invaluable link among the other 
National-state actors of the System, promoting the emergence of a new 
regional geopolitical bloc, shaped by the action of the geopolitical factor. 
5. The redistribution of power in the System indicates that Egypt’s active 
participation in the EastMed project, by means of a consolidated Greek-
Cypriot-Israeli-Egyptian alliance, results in the highest power performance at 
systemic level and, thus, this option prevails.  
At this point, Systemic Geopolitical Analysis is concluded. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the researcher may proceed to the geostrategic approach of the subject 
matter. 
 
 
Figure 3: Total Power Performance of Subsystems in the Geopolitical System of the South-
Eastern Mediterranean. 
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5. Geostrategic Synthesis 
As the results of the conducted Systemic Geopolitical Analysis imply, the role of 
Greece is upgraded in terms of power, driven by the action of the geopolitical factor. 
The development and operation of the EastMed Pipeline enhances the geopolitical 
potential of Greece, alongside that of Cyprus. Greece’s strategic choice to support and 
expand the initial Cyprus-Israel approach, has proved to be an excellent stance 
adopted by the Greek foreign policy. Turkish revisionist agenda could be tackled in the 
long run by such alliance, as well as the Russian efforts to re-establish its sphere of 
influence in past pro-Soviet regions; thus, Hellenism’s dipole could gain momentum 
and try to solve chronic conflicts from a new standpoint, while safeguarding 
international security architecture, as viewed by the West from the perspective of 
Spykman’s Rimland Theory.   
The newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the Levantine Sea have introduced 
a new framework for diverse cooperation among the states of the region, creating 
opportunities as well as dangers. The potential for stability, economic growth and 
security in the South-Eastern Mediterranean is high, if the appropriate equilibrium 
between benefits and costs is reached. The necessary balance between the national 
self-strengthening strategy and the collective strategy must be kept, on behalf of all 
National-state actors, in order to maximize benefits and minimize costs. Multilevel 
synergies in the energy sector shall provide the productive platform needed, to see 
such an endeavour through. A project of immense scale, such as the EastMed pipeline, 
can be the effective catalyst for the fulfilment of such aspirations, towards a safer and 
more prosperous future. 
The challenges to face and obstacles to overcome in order to realize this project 
are many and complex. For instance, the LNG vs Pipeline issue, given the advantages 
and disadvantages described in Chapter 1, will determine the policy choices to be 
made by the actors involved. Cyprus’s and Israel’s intent to use the existing Egyptian 
LNG facilities for gas exports by constructing new pipelines to Egypt, as the most 
favourable option for monetizing their resources, promotes Egypt’s goal of becoming a 
regional energy hub; the accomplishment of such a goal depends highly on the level of 
integration of these states’ gas volumes into their system; however, the feasibility of 
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this alternative contradicts the potential future security risks that may emerge and 
induce export disruptions, considering the region’s ongoing instability and that of 
Egypt, which is a factor that both Cyprus and Israel should take into account; 
moreover, in case that Egypt uses its resources for domestic use, their export options 
shall be narrowed down; in this regard, the EastMed pipeline becomes a more 
attractive option (Verocy, 2018).  
Another issue is the impact that other gas projects shall have on volatile and 
limited gas markets of Southern Europe, such as TAP, SCP and TurkStream 2. These 
projects, partly of Russian interests, could lead to market saturation prior to the 
EastMed’s commissioning which, combined with the project’s high cost and 
ambivalent supply capacity (security premiums against the EU free market policy could 
be imposed), would have rendered it unfeasible. To be economically viable, the 
EastMed project should be implemented based on aggregated sources and suppliers, 
including of course the two major producers: Egypt and Israel. However, the current 
outlet for offshore gas reserves of the Levant is the producers’ neighbouring countries. 
The commercial aspects of this enterprise should be considered thoroughly, and 
appropriate initiatives should be taken to connect sellers and buyers, ensuring 
flexibility and competitiveness for the former and guaranteed revenues for the latter, 
while giving newcomers the opportunity to enter the market and permitting the 
release of gas volumes to feed the EastMed pipeline (Tsafos, 2019). 
The EU’s approach towards energy exports from the South-Eastern Mediterranean 
consists of two basic alternatives: the EastMed Pipeline and LNG exports from Egypt 
(Baconi, 2017). Since the latter is the biggest producer with the highest amount of 
proven reserves and its own liquefaction facilities, it can act independently and 
become an aggregator for the region’s gas resources. Something like that would, of 
course, put up barriers to any EastMed pipeline planning. On the other hand, North 
European states and primarily Germany, the biggest natural gas importer from Russia, 
are in favour of more cheap gas imports from the East, in the face of the North Sea’s 
reserves depletion, whereas Eastern European countries oppose to such aspirations. 
Diversification is their choice, in their effort to avoid excessive reliance on Russia; in 
addition, states in the European south are also aligned with EU’s official policy, despite 
Germany’s political influence. For Greece, economic benefits from being a transit 
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country would increase by collecting transport fees, strengthening its role as energy 
hub and enhancing its energy security, as well as the political and geostrategic benefits 
from being part of a new emerging geopolitical bloc, that aims to establish a stability 
status in the region instead of fuelling new tensions. That is why, the EastMed pipeline 
is a strategic goal for the Greek foreign policy.  
The Cypriot-Israeli tie-up may counterbalance Egypt’s enormous potential to 
monopolize the ongoing developments, but also be a link that would forge an 
unprecedented alliance in the Mediterranean. If equilibrium is reached, energy 
cooperation among the four states shall deepen their political and military partnership, 
leading to the establishment of a solidified stability factor, something that both the US 
and the EU would applaud. Furthermore, since the Israeli export availability is 
projected to reach 2040, the project’s viability would require the enormous Egyptian 
reserves to be competitive in the markets; additionally, cooperation for regional 
security is a mutual target and security a prerequisite for investments, thus, the 
current Greek-Egyptian military collaboration reflects also the need for development 
and protection of new energy infrastructure, for the benefit of all. Interdependent 
needs and goals, political and economic benefits, geostrategic reasons along with the 
convergence of national interests, constitute a unique opportunity for the South-
Eastern Mediterranean. And although there are antagonistic interests among states, in 
a broader perspective, initiatives like the “East Mediterranean Gas Forum” which held 
its first meeting in January 2019, in Cairo, are paving the way.   
In this context, Greece should steadily support this project of high strategic 
importance for its own national interests and for the stability of the region, by taking 
initiatives to promote its construction, as well as the reinforcement of Egypt’s role; the 
MoU signed among Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Italy in 2017 excluded Egypt; Greece 
should intervene and endorse a more active involvement of Egypt, also by motivating 
the Egyptian government to act. Another factor of importance is the LNG vs pipeline 
issue that tends to push Israel and Cyprus to the first option, empowering Egypt’s 
status but at the same time weakening the EastMed’s prospect, to the detriment of 
the Greek and eventually Hellenism’s interests in the long run. Greece would need 
such infrastructure in the future to transport its own claimed sources, hoping for 
higher levels of political and energy independence, while a broad regional alliance as 
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an outcome of its development would be the long-needed counterweight to Ankara’s 
aggression.  
Under such circumstances, the Greek side could seek support in order to resolve 
the Cypriot question in the Greeks’ best interest; Greece’s upgraded role in the 
geopolitical system of the South-Eastern Mediterranean would empower its voice 
within the Atlantic Alliance, considering the political fluctuations of the Turkish side; 
Cyprus’s accession to NATO should also be a primary goal of the Greek foreign policy; 
initiatives should be taken at European level, in conjunction with other Southern 
(especially Italy) and Eastern European states, to promote diversification of supply, 
energy security and the EastMed project, adversely to Germany’s pursuits. Concrete 
alliances, aggregated energy sources and LNG-pipeline exports equilibrium should be 
the long-term goals of Greek policy, concerning the realization of the EastMed. The 
‘Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor’ is a strategic option for Greece and should be 
at the top of its political agenda. 
The energy triangle of Greece-Israel-Cyprus is a stabilizing element for the region. 
The geopolitical factor of the EastMed pipeline effectuates the systemic result of the 
geopolitical upgrade of these states in the System of the South-Eastern 
Mediterranean. On the other hand, the military alliance of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt 
could bring together Israel and Egypt at this level, additionally to their rapprochement 
in terms of energy cooperation. As the geopolitical model in this research has 
indicated, such an alliance would create a powerful geopolitical bloc having a 
significant impact at systemic level and being able to confront any external 
interferences; leaving Egypt out of the equation, would leave the door open for 
instability, a door that revisionist powers would presumably attempt to walk through.  
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Conclusions 
This dissertation has investigated the geopolitical impact of the transportation of 
Natural Gas to the European markets via the EastMed Pipeline. The proposed project 
has been designed to cover the export needs of Israel and Cyprus, regarding the recent 
discoveries of gas reserves within their territorial waters. These findings of new 
hydrocarbon resources in the South-Eastern Mediterranean have caused upheaval in 
the region and tend to transform the established security architecture, causing a 
redistribution of power among regional and international key players. 
The conducted literature review has resulted in some theoretical conclusions 
about the emerging situation. The geopolitical upgrade of Greece, Israel and Cyprus is 
a significant outcome, as well as the conflicting prospects for energy exploitation and 
transit described by various scholars, which shape the political developments and the 
foreign policy agendas of the actors. This research has focused on identifying specific 
aspects of the EastMed project and estimating its impact in the Geopolitical System of 
the South-Eastern Mediterranean. The main objectives were to examine the 
redistribution of power within the System, the effect of the project on the geopolitical 
role of Greece and its foreign policy concerning Cyprus, as well as to specify the 
geopolitical effect of the Greek-Cypriot-Israeli-Egyptian alliance.  
Instead of limiting the research to theoretical assumptions and suggestions, this 
dissertation has studied the subject from a quantitative standpoint. For this purpose, 
the methodology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis has been applied. The redistribution 
of power in the System and the geopolitical effect caused by the geopolitical factor, 
i.e., the EastMed pipeline, was estimated in terms of power. The Pillars of 
Defence/Security and Politics were chosen for the quantification and the description of 
the geopolitical dynamics within the System.  
After the implementation of the methodology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis, 
the geopolitical model of redistribution of power in the Geopolitical System was 
constructed. According to the model, some of the main conclusions are the following: 
1. Greece’s geopolitical role is upgraded substantially. 
2. The Greek-Cypriot-Israeli alliance has a strong geopolitical influence within the 
boundaries of the System. 
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3. The dipole of Hellenism constitutes an invaluable link among the other 
National-state actors of the System, promoting the emergence of a new 
regional geopolitical bloc, shaped by the action of the geopolitical factor. 
4. The redistribution of power in the System indicates that Egypt’s active 
participation in the EastMed project, by means of a consolidated Greek-
Cypriot-Israeli-Egyptian alliance, results in the highest power performance at 
systemic level and, thus, this option prevails.  
5. Greece’s strategic choice to support and expand the initial Cyprus-Israel 
approach, has proved to be an excellent stance adopted by the Greek foreign 
policy, which can now use the benefits provided by the new alliances to reach 
a more efficient solution to the Cyprus conflict. 
The outcome of this research complies with the conclusions of many authors, 
considering the geopolitical upgrade of Greece, Cyprus and Israel. However, the role of 
Egypt sometimes is viewed with doubt, in relation to the Greece-Cyprus-Israel axis, by 
some authors. A possible closer cooperation is thought to be unrealistic or isn’t 
adequately examined in many cases. This study has shown the geopolitical effect of 
such an alliance, not vaguely and theoretically but through quantification of the 
geopolitical characteristics assessed.  
Nevertheless, due to scope and length limitations, many aspects of the subject 
matter remain unaddressed and may be considered for further research. Underlined in 
the sections of this dissertation, some critical issues concerning the EastMed pipeline 
and the Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves should be investigated, to formulate a 
more representative description of the geopolitical status and dynamics of the region. 
Some recommendations for further research in this area may include the following: 
1. The economic aspects of the project in terms of power, which are of 
tremendous value for the assessment and description of regional dynamics, 
based on the action of the designated geopolitical factor (Pillar of Economy). 
2. The comparison between the competitive pipelines EastMed and TurkStream 2 
or TAP. The economic and geostrategic assessment of the antagonism 
between the Russian gas projects and the Mediterranean producers, targeting 
the markets of the South-Eastern Europe. 
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3. ‘Southern Gas Corridor’ vs ‘Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor’. 
4. The Pillar of Culture/Information in relation to the EastMed project. 
5. The scenario for the exploitation and transportation of Greek gas volumes to 
the European markets, via the EastMed pipeline. 
6. The participation of Egypt in the EastMed project as a supplier of Natural Gas. 
7. The geopolitical effect of the project to other states of the geographical 
complex of the South-Eastern Mediterranean, such as Lebanon, Syria, Libya 
and Jordan. 
8. The geopolitical effect of the project to other states involved indirectly such as 
Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania.  
9. The scenario for the exploitation of the Levantine sea resources via both LNG 
ships and the EastMed pipeline.   
10. Northern Europe vs South-Eastern Europe and Natural Gas Supply: ‘Russian 
influence’ and ‘Diversification’.  
This dissertation has contributed to the critical approach and quantification of the 
geopolitical impact of the EastMed pipeline project, in terms of redistribution of power 
within the spatial boundaries of the Geopolitical System of the South-Eastern 
Mediterranean, as defined in chapter 2. Greece’s upgraded role has been analysed to 
the greatest extent possible, given the unavoidable research limitations, in an effort to 
provide a useful tool for self-reflection and decision-making.  
To this end, some policy recommendations have been submitted as a part of the 
geostrategic synthesis conducted in this research; Greece should endorse a more 
active involvement of Egypt; moreover, initiatives must be taken to reach a high level 
of aggregated resources and LNG-pipeline exports equilibrium; finally, the ‘Eastern 
Mediterranean Energy Corridor’ is a strategic goal for Greece and must be pursued. 
The geopolitical implications of the recent energy discoveries in the region may 
generate severe threats, but at the same time they create alternative paths towards 
prosperity and cooperation. The researcher can only hope that this work has inspired 
those inclined to walk the second path.     
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MAP 1: IGB, IGI, Poseidon and EastMed Pipelines (Energy Press, 2016). 
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MAP 2: Spykman’s Rimland (Exploring the Geopolitics of the Cold War, 2016). 
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MAP 3: Eurasian conflict zones (Spykman, 2004, p.176). 
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MAP 4: Exclusive Economic Zones in the Eastern Mediterranean (Ellinas, et al., 2016, p. 6). 
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                                 Map 5: Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone and offshore exploration blocks (Ellinas, et al., 2016, p. 12). 
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